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Abstract
We develop a model of political competition with endogenous platform choices
of parties and endogenous turnout. A main finding is that a party that is lead-
ing in the polls has an incentive to cater primarily to the core voters of the
opposing party. A party that is lagging behind, by contrast, has an incentive to
cater to its own base. We analyze the implications for redistributive taxation
and characterize the political weights that competing parties assign to voters
with different incomes. Finally, we relate the comparative statics predictions of
our model to the asymmetric demobilization strategy in the German elections
in the era of Merkel.
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Introduction
This paper has two main contributions. First, it develops a model of political compe-
tition in which the parties' platform choices and the voters' participation in elections
are jointly determined in equilibrium. Second, it uses this framework for a political
economy analysis of redistributive taxation.
Political competition. Most of the previous political economy literature has fo-
cused either on platform choices or on endogenous turnout. By combining the two
we obtain a framework where parties face a tradeoff between, on the one hand, ap-
pealing to as many voters as possible, and on the other hand, ensuring that these
potential voters turn out to vote. A potential voter of, say, party 1 is weakly better
off if party 1 wins and implements its platform. Being among those who prefer party
1 over party 2 is, however, only a necessary condition for voting in favor of party 1.
Potential voters are turned into actual voters only if the stakes are sufficiently high,
i.e., they must be incentivized to fight for a victory of their party. A voter who is close
to being indifferent between the two parties lacks such incentives, since in this case
the gain in utility from having her preferred party elected does not justify incurring
the voting cost. Thus, parties face a tradeoff between adopting polices that are good
for the size of their electorate (or base) and policies that are good for mobilization.
Consequently, best responses are such that parties don't aim at attracting as many
supporters as they could, nor do they do everything they can to mobilize. The typical
situation is that of a party that can enlarge its base by moving, say, to the right, but
understands that such a move reduces its ability to mobilize its base.
First, we draw on the probabilistic voting model  see Coughlin and Nitzan (1981)
and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)  to determine how voters sort into the two par-
ties' bases. Specifically, voters have both policy preferences and idiosyncratic party
preferences. A voter can therefore be attracted to the base of party 1 because she
likes the platform of party 1 better, or because she likes party 1 for exogenous rea-
sons that we are not explicitly modeling. With well-behaved distributions of these
preferences, a party's base responds in a continuous way to changes in the party's
platform, and there are pure strategy equilibria even with multi-dimensional policy
spaces. The probabilistic voting model is one of the workhorses in the formal analysis
of party competition. However, this literature typically assumes that voter turnout
is exogenous.
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Second, we draw on models of ethical voting  originally proposed by Harsanyi
(1980) and more recently analyzed by Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006)  to endogenize turnout. These models have been proposed as a way
of adressing the paradox of voting.1 It is assumed that voting is costly and that voting
behavior is driven by a desire to fulfill a civic duty  formalized as a rule-utilitarian
criterion for turnout. Thus, individuals choose a turnout rule (e.g., a probability of
voting, or a threshold voting cost) that is optimal on the assumption that everyone
with the same party preferences behaves according to the same rule.2 Such group
behavior is able to affect the outcome of the election, thus leading to non-trivial
equilibrium turnout rates. These depend on how much voters have at stake: when
their aggregate benefit from winning the election is higher, more individuals of a given
group turn out to vote. This literature delivers predictions that are consistent with
empirical facts on turnout, but it generally considers exogenous policy platforms.
Our formal analysis merges these two models so that both policies and turnout
are endogenous outcomes. We focus on the implications of the trade-off between the
number of potential voters (or base) and mobilization. We establish conditions for
equilibrium existence, fully characterize the equilibrium analytically, and provide a
comparative statics analysis.
Political economy of redistributive taxation. Throughout, we use the political
economy of redistributive income taxation as our main application. We have two
reasons for this choice of policy space. First, it is a stylized fact that the rich are
more likely to participate in elections than the poor. For a model with endogenous
turnout, it is therefore interesting to investigate a policy domain that allows for a
differential treatment of the rich and the poor. While our formal analysis does not
rest on the assumption of differential turnout across income groups, the difference
between welfare-maximizing and political equilibrium tax rates becomes very stark
in this case. Second, while the literature developed a powerful normative theory of
income taxation (see, e.g., Sheshinski (1972); Mirrlees (1971)), there is no such broadly
1The paradox is that observed turnout in elections is positive even though rational agents have
no incentive to participate since the probability of being pivotal in large elections is negligible.
2Ethical voter models differ in some aspects: For instance, Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) model
the electorate as being split between ethical and non-ethical voters. Coate and Conlin (2004) only
have ethical voters in their framework. Our analysis is closer to Feddersen and Sandroni (2006),
but we could as well have adopted the modelling choices of Coate and Conlin (2004). We provide
a more detailed comparison of these approaches in the Online-Appendix, where we also show that
these modelling choices are inconsequential for our main results.
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accepted conceptual framework for a positive analysis of income taxation where tax
rates arise as the outcome of political competition. Our theory can be viewed as a
generalization of the seminal contribution by Meltzer and Richard (1981), allowing
for the endogeneity of turnout and arbitrarily non-linear income tax schedules.
We show that the tax policy can be characterized as maximizing a virtual welfare
function where the weights on the utilities realized by different types of voters arise
endogenously in equilibrium. These political weights do not depend on whether taxes
are linear or non-linear. Our main result is to characterize them in closed-form. When
turnout is exogenous, parties place larger weights on income groups that have a larger
number of swing voters, i.e., who are on the verge of indifference between the two
candidates. When turnout is endogenous, the political weights at each income level
are instead determined by the fractions of core supporters of both parties, i.e., their
number of supporters when they propose the same platform. On the one hand, each
party has an incentive to adopt a policy that is attractive to its own core voters,
because increasing the stakes of its most loyal supporters is a way to get them out to
vote. On the other hand, a policy that is appealing to the core voters of the competing
party is also attractive, as this makes it harder for the rival party to mobilize its base.
Crucially, we find that the extent to which a party caters to its rival's clientele, as
opposed to its own, is increasing in its probability of winning the election. That is,
the front-runner (resp., the runner-up) targets its campaign promises mostly to the
opposition's (resp., to its own) core voters.
Asymmetric demobilization. We finally examine the German federal elections
between 2005 and 2017 through the lens of our model. We focus on these episodes
because the term asymmetric demobilization was coined by political analysts to char-
acterize and explain the success of Angela Merkel's electoral campaigns. Following
the near loss in the 2005 election where she catered primarily to her own core vorers,
Angela Merkel adopted many positions of her main challenger, the social democratic
party (SPD). For instance, the party manifesto for the 2013 election included de-
mands for minimum wages, rent controls and a financial transactions tax, positions
close to the heart of social democrats. We document this shift in positions using a
quantitative text analysis of party manifestos. In all later elections (2009, 2013, and
2017) her party was at least 10 percent ahead of the SPD. Overall turnout in these
elections fell to levels not witnessed before. Turnout was, moreover, asymmetric: the
potential voters of the conservatives turned out in larger fractions than the potential
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voters of the SPD. We provide a detailed discussion of these elections using our the-
oretical framework and, importantly, show that these outcomes are aligned with the
comparative statics predictions of our model.
Related literature. Our analysis relates to the literature on the paradox of vot-
ing. Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) are classical references. Various
approaches have since been explored to develop a model that explains both partici-
pation and abstentions in elections, see Feddersen (2004) for a survey.3 We draw on
one strand of this literature due to Harsanyi (1980), Coate and Conlin (2004) and
Feddersen and Sandroni (2006). We square this ethical voter model with a model of
party competition in which the parties' platform choices are endogenous variables,
the probabilistic voting model due to Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987).
Models of rational voting, often referred to as pivotal-voter models, are a promi-
nent alternative.4 An important contribution is by Ledyard (1984). In Ledyard's
model, equilibrium turnout is positive if the alternatives are exogenously given and
distinct. If the alternatives are instead endogenous variables, chosen by two com-
peting candidates who seek to win an election, then the equilibrium has policy con-
vergence, i.e. both candidates proposing the same platform, and, as a consequence,
zero turnout. There are similarities and differences to our approach. Our equilibrium
analysis also gives rise to policy convergence and we also find that policy convergence
lowers turnout. We do not find that policy convergence implies zero turnout. In our
framework, idiosyncratic party preferences imply that some voters turn out for party
1 and some voters for party 2, even if the two parties propose the same tax policy.
We contribute to the literature on the political economy of redistributive taxation.
Many previous contributions have focused on the model of linear income taxation
by Sheshinski (1972). Roberts (1977) has shown that the median voter's preferred
policy is a Condorcet winner in this framework. Its empirical implications have been
analyzed by Meltzer and Richard (1981). A prominent one is that redistributive taxes
should be higher when pre-tax inequality  as measured by the gap between average
and median income  is more pronounced. This prediction often fails in the data and
3More recent contributions include Callander and Wilson (2007), Degan and Merlo (2011) or
Aldashev (2015).
4Coate et al. (2008) argue that the ethical voter model provides a better fit for data on turnout
than the pivotal voter model.
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this has led to a search for alternative explanations, see e.g. Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) or Bénabou and Tirole (2006). Different turnout rates among the rich and the
poor are one such explanation, see the discussion in Larcinese (2007); Sabet (2016) and
the references therein. This literature has treated turnout as an exogenous variable;
i.e., the possibility that turnout may depend on the parties' proposals has not been
taken into account. Our analysis of the election campaigns in the era of Merkel in
Germany shows that this feedback channel can be important.
Both for linear and non-linear income taxation, our equilibrium characterization
uses the notion of generalized social welfare weights of Saez and Stantcheva (2016).
Generalized social welfare weights facilitate a clarification of whether political equi-
librium tax policies are as if a concave social welfare function was maximized, or,
alternatively, whether political competition gives rise to a political failure, Besley
(2006).
There is a rich literature in political science that investigates to what extent
parties cater towards their core voters or to swing voters. Cox (2009) provides a
survey of this literature. It has also been noted that parties may have an incentive
to target their promises to the core voters of the competing party, see Erikson and
Romero (1990) or Adams and Merrill III (2011). Our contribution relative to this
literature is to provide a unified framework that nests these opposing forces. This
makes it possible to have a systematic analysis of how parties should trade them off
in an attempt to win an election. Our result that the front-runner in an election has
stronger incentives to cater to the core voters of the competitor and that the runner
up should focus primarily on its own core voters also arises under certain conditions
in the recent paper by Bernhardt et al. (2018), but from a different channel: in their
model, turnout is exogenous and parties care not only about their probability of
winning but also their vote share.
Outline. The remainder is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces a general
setup for an analysis of political competition that connects probabilistic voting with
endogenous turnout. In Section 2 we apply this framework to characterize the political
equilibrium tax rate and we derive empirically testable implications. In Section 3, we
study German elections between 2005 and 2017 and interpret Merkel's asymmetric
demobilization strategy through the lens of our model. Section 4 contains the analysis
of non-linear taxes. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of generalized social welfare
weights. Formal proofs are relegated to the Online-Appendix.
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1 General framework
1.1 Endogenous turnout
Two political parties j ∈ {1, 2} compete by choosing policies from a set of feasible
policies P. Party j's proposal is denoted by pj ∈ P. For now, we leave the set P
abstract.
Preferences. There is a continuum of citizens of mass one. Citizens differ in their
preferences over policies. To formalize this preference heterogeneity we distinguish
different types of citizens. The set of types is denoted by Ω. For any ω ∈ Ω, we
denote by u(p, ω) the utility that a type-ω citizen realizes under policy p ∈ P. In
the income tax application, ω will determine an individual's position in the income
distribution and will thus shape preferences over redistributive taxation.5 The cross-
sectional distribution of types ω ∈ Ω is common knowledge and represented by a
cumulative distribution function F with density f .
Individuals not only have preferences over policy outcomes but also idiosyncratic
party preferences. These preferences may be shaped by cultural and ethnic identi-
ties, party histories, or fixed party positions in certain policy domains. Formally, the
random variable ε ∈ R denotes an agent's idiosyncratic preference for party 2. Con-
ditional on ω, party preferences ε of different voters are independent and identically
distributed. Thus, an individual with type ω and party preference ε supports party 1
if u(p1, ω) ≥ u(p2, ω) + ε. We denote by B(· | ω) the cumulative distribution function
of party preferences ε among individuals of type ω, and by b(· | ω) the corresponding
density function. Therefore, the probability that a type-ω individual supports party
1 is given by
B(u(p1, ω) − u(p2, ω) | ω).
In particular, if both parties propose the same policy p1 = p2, the fraction of agents
with type ω who support party 1 is given by B(0 | ω). This formalism allows for the
possibility that (say) party 2 receives more support than party 1 from high ω-types
(the rich in the income tax application) and less from low ω-types (the poor), for
instance, if the distributions B(· | ω) can be ordered according to first order stochastic
dominance (see also Dixit and Londregan (1998)).
5In the Online Appendix, we also sketch an application where ω is a measure of an individual's
valuation of public goods.
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Ethical voting and party bases. The mass of type-ω supporters of each party j
is split into two groups: a fraction 1 − q˜j(ω) of these agents always abstains, and a
fraction q˜j(ω) decides whether to vote based on a rule-utilitarian calculation.6 The
literature often refers to this last group as ethical voters.
We seek a framework where the election outcome is uncertain both from the voters'
and the parties' perspectives. A convenient approach, also adopted by Feddersen and
Sandroni (2006), is to assume that q˜j(ω) is a random variable and that its realization
is unknown when parties choose platforms and when potential voters decide whether
or not to turn out. More specifically, we assume that q˜1(ω) and q˜2(ω) have the same
expected value q¯(ω) ∈ (0, 1). That is, a type-ω supporter of party 1 is as likely to
be of the ethical type as a type-ω supporter of party 2. Finally, we put the following
structure on how realizations of q˜1(ω) and q˜2(ω) relate to the mean.
Assumption 1. For each party j, there is a non-negative random variable ηj with
mean 1 such that
q˜j(ω) = ηj · q¯(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
This assumption stipulates that the uncertainty regarding the size of a party's
base stems from a common shock that equally applies to all segments of the type
distribution. This party-specific variable ηj can be interpreted as a characteristic
of candidate j (say, likeability) or the exposition to negative advertising (see, e.g.,
Krupnikov (2011)) whose impact on voters' decision to participate is imperfectly
measured and revealed only on election day. The possibility that, say, party 1 is
affected by a positive shock η1 > 1 and party 2 is affected by a negative shock η2 < 1,
or vice versa, generates uncertainty in election outcomes.7 Assumption 1 is imposed
in the sequel without further mention.
The ethical supporters are a party's potential voters. For ease of exposition, we
also refer to the expected mass of these agents as a party's base. That is, given two
6We follow Coate and Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) and assume that there
are no always-voters, i.e., individuals who come to the ballot irrespectively of how high their voting
costs are. In the Online Appendix, we present a version of our model that includes such voters and
gives rise to an equilibrium analysis that is equivalent to the one developed in the body of the text.
7Note that the shocks to the two parties' bases may be correlated. We do not impose an
assumption of independence.
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policies p1 and p2, the base of party 1 is given by
B1(p1, p2) = E[ q¯(ω)B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω) ], (1)
where the expectation operator E indicates the computation of a population average
with respect to different types ω. We define the base of party 2 analogously, so that
B2(p1, p2) = E[q¯(ω)] − B1(p1, p2). (2)
Note that the two parties' bases add up to a constant. Hence, a change in the proposed
policies that increases, say, the base for party 1, translates one-for-one into a decrease
of party 2's base.
Net gains from winning  stakes. The stakes for the potential voters of party
1 are defined as the expected (utilitarian) welfare gain that is realized if a victory by
party 2 is avoided. Formally,
W 1(p1, p2) = E
[ˆ
R
max
{
u(p1, ω)− [u(p2, ω) + ε] , 0} b(ε | ω) dε ] . (3)
The integrand in equation (3) is the difference in utilities realized under the policies p1
and p2, including the welfare gains or losses due to the idiosyncratic party preferences
ε. The max operator indicates that the summation over ε takes into account only
the agents for whom this utility difference is positive, i.e., the supporters of party 1.
Analogously, we define
W 2(p1, p2) = E
[ ˆ
R
max
{
[u(p2, ω) + ε]− u(p1, ω) , 0} b(ε | ω) dε ] . (4)
Voting costs. We denote by σj the fraction of ethical supporters of party j who
actually turn out to vote. We define the (expected) aggregate voting cost of the
ethical supporters of party j by k(σj)Bj(p1, p2), where for some µ ≥ 0,
k(σj) =
κ
1 + 1
µ
(σj)1+
1
µ . (5)
This isoelastic functional form unifies several cases. First, if all the ethical voters
have the same per capita voting cost κ and choose an individual probability of voting
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σj, we have k(σj) = κσj, i.e., an infinite elasticity µ→∞. Second, as in Coate and
Conlin (2004) and Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), suppose that any one voter has a
voting cost equal to κ× σ, where σ is an idiosyncratic component that is i.i.d. across
voters and uniformly distributed over the unit interval. In this case, σj is a cutoff
so that all ethical supporters of party 1 with σ ≤ σj are turning out to vote. We
then have k(σj) = κ
´ σj
0
σ dσ = κ
2
(σj)2, i.e., a unit elasticity µ = 1. Third, as we
argue below, an inelastic cost function with µ → 0 turns our setup into a standard
probabilistic voting model with exogenous turnout.
Endogenous turnout. The ethical supporters of each party j adhere to a rule for
participation in the election that maximizes their aggregate expected utility, taking
the costs of voting into account. As a consequence, turnout depends on the parties'
policy proposals. In the Online Appendix, we show that this problem of the ethical
supporters of party j admits the following calculus of voting representation: taking
as given the distributions of preferences and ethical voters, the policies (p1, p2), and
the other party's turnout rule σ−j, choose σj ∈ [0, 1] to maximize
pij(p1, p2, σ1, σ2) W j(p1, p2) − k(σj)Bj(p1, p2), (6)
where pij(p1, p2, σ1, σ2) is the probability that party j wins the election. That is, the
ethical supporters of party j face the following trade-off. On the one hand, a higher
turnout σj raises the probability pij that their favorite party wins, which in turn
increases their aggregate welfare by W j. On the other hand, a higher σj raises their
aggregate voting costs as k(σj)Bj is increasing in σj.
Equilibrium turnout. Given p1 and p2, an equilibrium of the turnout game is a
pair of turnout rates (σ1∗(p1, p2), σ2∗(p1, p2)) that are mutually best responses.
1.2 Equilibrium
Best responses and equilibrium policies. We assume that parties seek to maxi-
mize their probability of winning the election. For a given policy p2, the best response
problem of party 1 is to choose p1 to maximize
p¯i1(p1, p2) := pi1(p1, p2, σ1∗(p1, p2), σ2∗(p1, p2)).
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A pair of equilibrium policies (p1, p2) satisfies p¯i1(p1, p2) ≥ p¯i1(pˆ1, p2), for all pˆ1 ∈ P
and p¯i1(p1, p2) ≤ p¯i1(p1, pˆ2), for all pˆ2 ∈ P. In such an equilibrium, parties take into
account that alternative policy choices would also affect the equilibrium of the turnout
subgame (σ1∗(p1, p2), σ2∗(p1, p2)). We are interested in equilibria that are interior, i.e.,
which are such that turnout responds at the margin to changes in proposed policies.8
Equilibrium existence and uniqueness can be established by standard arguments 
invoking Brouwer's fixed point theorem  when the policy space is one-dimensional.
We cover this case in the context of the linear income tax model in Section 2. The
non-linear income tax case needs a separate treatment, see Section 4.
1.3 Equilibrium characterization
We now turn to an equilibrium characterization that facilitates the analysis of specific
policies in the context of our model.
Lemma 1 (Relative turnout). Take the parties' proposals p1 and p2 as given. If
the equilibrium of the turnout subgame (σ1∗(p1, p2), σ2∗(p1, p2)) satisfies the first-order
conditions of the optimization problems (6) for j ∈ {1, 2}, then
σ1∗(p1, p2)
σ2∗(p1, p2)
=
[
W 1(p1, p2) /B1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2) /B2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
. (7)
The left-hand side of this equation is a measure of party 1's turnout advantage:
the larger σ∗1/σ
∗
2, the larger the number of ethical supporters who turn out to vote
for party 1, relative to the number of supporters who turn out to vote for party
2. The right-hand side is a ratio of the welfare gains per capita, W j/Bj, that the
supporters of both parties can realize in case of winning the election. Thus, according
to equation (7), the relative turnout for party 1 is increasing in the relative amounts
that its supporters and the opposition have at stake.
The tradeoff between base and turnout. By combining Lemma 1 with As-
sumption 1 we find that party 1's probability of winning is a monotonic function of
8Corner solutions where all or none of the ethical voters participate are conceivable, but not
very interesting. The analysis is then similar to the case with exogenous turnout.
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a product of two terms:
RB(p1, p2) :=
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
and Rσ(p1, p2) :=
σ1∗(p1, p2)
σ2∗(p1, p2)
.
The first term is a measure of of the party's relative base advantage, the second term
is a measure of its relative turnout advantage. We thus obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 (Party objectives). Party 1's objective is to maximize
RB(p1, p2) × Rσ(p1, p2), (8)
and party 2's objective is to minimize it.
Equation (8) reveals that parties face a trade-off between the size of their base
and their turnout advantage. If turnout was exogenous, party 1 would simply fo-
cus on maximizing RB(p1, p2), or equivalently its own base B1(p1, p2) since equation
(2) implies that RB(p1, p2) is an increasing function of B1. If instead the base was
exogenously given, party 1 would maximize its turnout advantage Rσ(p1, p2). With
both an endogenous base and endogenous turnout, party 1 faces a trade-off between
maximizing the number of its supporters and maximizing their relative propensity to
vote.
To illustrate this trade-off, suppose that p1∗ is a best response of party 1 to the
policy p2 proposed by party 2. Also suppose that the policy space P is such that local
deviations from p1∗ are well defined. Now consider a deviation from p1∗ that takes
the form p1∗+  pˆ, where pˆ describes the direction of the deviation from p1∗ and  > 0
is a scalar that measures the size of this deviation. The deviation induces a payoff
for party 1 equal to RB(p1∗ +  pˆ, p2)Rσ(p1∗ +  pˆ, p2). Now, if p1∗ is a best response,
then it must be true that this expression is, for any feasible deviation pˆ, maximized
by choosing the parameter  = 0. The corresponding first-order condition is
RBpˆ (p
1∗, p2)Rσ(p1∗, p2) + RB(p1∗, p2)Rσpˆ (p
1∗, p2) = 0, (9)
where RBpˆ (p
1∗, p2) := ∂
∂
RB(p1∗ + pˆ1, p2)
∣∣
=0
denotes the (functional) derivative of
RB in direction pˆ evaluated at the hypothetical pair of policies (p1∗, p2), andRσpˆ (p
1∗, p2)
is analogously defined.
To interpret this condition, suppose for simplicity that P is the unit interval and
that p1∗ lies in its interior. This applies, for instance, to the model of linear income
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taxation that we cover in Section 2. In this model, higher values of p1 are associated
with more redistributive or leftist policies. With P as the unit interval there is only
one feasible direction of policy reform, so that pˆ is simply a (positive or negative)
constant. Now suppose that party 1's best response is such that its base could be
increased by means of a more leftist policy, i.e., RBpˆ (p
1∗, p2) > 0. Then, the first-order
condition (9) implies that Rσpˆ (p
1∗, p2) < 0, so that by moving to the left in an effort to
enlarge its base, the party sacrifices turnout. Thus, parties run into a trade-off that
forces them to compromise the implications of their policy proposals for their base
advantage with the implications of their policy proposals for their turnout advantage.
Around the best response, what is good for the former is bad for the latter and vice
versa.
Equilibrium characterization. Lemma 2 highlights that the tradeoff between
base and turnout is central to our analysis. It does not yet illuminate, however, how
parties resolve that tradeoff. Using equation (7) to substitute for the relative turnout
σ1∗/σ2∗ in (8) leads to our first main result.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium characterization). Party 1's objective is to maximize
ψ1(p1, p2) :=
1
1 + µ
log
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
+
µ
1 + µ
log
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
, (10)
and party 2's objective is to minimize it. Thus, if (p1∗, p2∗) is a pair of interior
subgame perfect equilibrium policies, then it is a saddle point of the function ψ1(p1, p2).
To understand Proposition 1, it is useful to focus in a first step on the polar cases
µ→ 0 and µ→∞. Suppose that µ→ 0, that is, the per capita cost of voting k(σj) is
inelastic. In this case, equation (10) implies that party 1 seeks to maximize its relative
base B1/B2 or, equivalently, its own base B1. This objective is what party 1 would
maximize in an environment with exogenous turnout. Thus, our framework nests the
special case where turnout does not respond to the parties' policy platforms, or where
parties do not consider the implications of their choices on voter participation.
Suppose next that µ → ∞, that is, the cost functions k(σj) are linear. In this
case, the bases no longer appear in expression (10), and party 1 only seeks to max-
imize W 1/W 2. This is because the influence of the base on σ1∗/σ2∗ (equation (7))
exactly cancels with the expression B1/B2 that also appears on the right hand side
of equation (8). Intuitively, suppose that party 1 proposes a policy that increases
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its base of supporters B1. The aggregate cost of participating κσ1B1 also increases
proportionally with the size of the base. As a result, the relative turnout advantage
for party 1 decreases one-for-one. Thus, the product of the relative base advantage
and the relative turnout advantage, and hence the overall probability of winning, is
unchanged. Therefore, if turnout is endogenous and voting costs are linear, parties
do not care about the size of their base.
For intermediate values of µ ∈ (0,∞), party 1 maximizes a weighted sum ψ1(p1, p2)
of the relative base B1/B2 and the relative welfare gains W 1/W 2. Expression (10)
is obtained by substituting for the relative turnout (7) in party 1's objective (8). It
implies that the relative weight that party 1's platform choice puts on the objective
W 1/W 2 is proportional to the elasticity µ of the cost function k(·).
Mobilizing one's supporters vs. demobilizing the opposition. Consider the
case µ → ∞. Party 1 then has two competing aims. On the one hand, it would like
to propose a policy p1 that makes W 1 as large as possible, i.e., that makes its own
supporters as well off as possible compared to the welfare they would obtain under
the opposition's platform p2. Doing so encourages its own supporters to turn out by
increasing how much they have at stake in the election. On the other hand, party
1 would also like to propose a policy p1 that makes W 2 as small as possible, i.e.,
that does not hurt party 2's supporters too much compared to the welfare they could
obtain under their preferred policy p2. Doing so discourages the opposition from
turning out by lowering how much they have at stake. Therefore, the tradeoff for
both parties is between mobilizing their own base (maximizing W 1) and demobilizing
their opponent's base (minimizing W 2). With exogenous turnout these objectives
of maximizing or minimizing what is at stake for each group would be irrelevant.
Any positive, no matter how small, benefit W 1 for its supporters would deliver the
same number of votes for party 1. Similarly, no attempt to soothe the opposition
by lowering their stakes W 2 > 0 could ever increase party 1's vote share. With
endogenous turnout, instead, the magnitude of W 1 and W 2 is crucial.
The tradeoff between mobilization and demobilization also appears for finite levels
of µ. In that case, when choosing their platforms, parties also need to trade off these
effects with the implications for the size of their parties' bases.
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2 Linear income taxation
It is a stylized fact that individuals with higher incomes are more likely to participate
in elections than individuals with lower incomes. Studying how the endogeneity of
turnout affects equilibrium policies is therefore most interesting for polices that treat
the rich and the poor differently. Our main focus is thus on the income tax-and-
transfer system. We assume in this section that an admissible tax policy is affine,
i.e., it consists of a constant labor income tax rate and a universal lump-sum transfer
that balances the government budget. This is the setting analyzed by, e.g., Sheshinski
(1972) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). In Section 4, we consider arbitrarily non-
linear income taxation.
Setup. Individuals value after-tax income or private consumption denoted by c,
and incur a disutility from the productive effort that is needed to generate pre-tax
income y. Preferences of a type ω-individual over (c, y)-pairs are represented by the
utility function U (c, y, ω), where u is twice continuously differentiable and satisfies
Uc > 0, Uy < 0. For ease of exposition, we take the utility function to be quasilinear
in c and the effort cost function to be isoleastic. Hence,
U (c, y, ω) = c− 1
1 + 1
e
( y
ω
)1+ 1
e
. (11)
A redistributive tax policy proposed by party j consists of a constant labor income
tax rate τ j and a universal lump-sum rebate Rj ∈ R. Given such a policy (τ j, Rj),
voters choose their pre-tax income y so as to maximize their utility U (c, y, ω) subject
to the budget constraint
c = (1− τ j) y + Rj.
We denote by yj (ω) the pre-tax labor income chosen by an agent with type ω given
the policy τ j of party j. It is easy to show that, since marginal effort costs are
decreasing in the individual's type (i.e., the single-crossing condition Uyω > 0 holds),
higher types ω earn higher (before- and after-tax) incomes than lower types. Thus,
we refer to high types as the rich and low types as the poor.
An admissible policy platform (τ j, Rj) must balance the government budget.
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Hence it must satisfy
Rj = τ j E[ yj (ω) ]. (12)
This requirement determines the transfer Rj as a function of the tax rate τ j, so that
the policy space P is one-dimensional. Without loss of generality, we assume in the
following that admissible tax rates lie in a compact interval P = [τ , τ ] that includes
all Pareto-efficient ones. Thus, if τ ≤ τ all individuals benefit from higher taxes,
and if τ ≥ τ all individuals benefit from lower taxes. In the sequel we simply denote
party j's policy by τ j, and let u(τ j, ω) denote the utility of agent ω realized under
this policy.
Equilibrium existence. The following lemma provides a direct proof of the ex-
istence, uniqueness, and symmetry of a pure-strategy equilibrium under standard
assumptions on preferences.
Lemma 3 (Equilibrium existence, uniqueness and symmetry). Assume that
the utility function u (τ, ω) is single-peaked in the tax rate τ . Then there exists a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. This equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., τ 1 = τ 2.
The symmetry of the equilibrium is due to the fact that the first-order condition
that τ 1 needs to fulfill to qualify as a maximizer of party 1's objective ψ1(τ 1, τ 2) is
identical to the condition that τ 2 needs to fulfill to be a minimizer. That is, if for
instance µ→∞, in equilibrium the weight that party 1 places on mobilizing its own
supporters is exactly equal to the weight that party 2 places on demobilizing the
supporters of party 1. Conversely, the weight that party 1 places on demobilizing the
supporters of party 2 is equal to the weight that party 2 places on mobilizing its own
supporters. This shows that endogenous turnout does not by itself imply that parties
have an incentive to differentiate from each other.9
Welfare-maximization. As a benchmark, we sketch the policy that would be cho-
sen by a benevolent planner. Having this benchmark facilitates the interpretation of
the political equilibrium tax rates that are characterized subsequently. Consider a
9If rather than maximizing their probabilities of winning the election, parties maximized their
number of votes, or a weighted sum of these objectives, the equilibrium would no longer be symmetric.
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social welfare function
SW (τ) := E [g (ω)u (τ, ω) ]; (13)
where g(ω) is the social welfare weight placed on the utility of type ω-individuals.
An unweighted utilitarian welfare function has g(ω) = 1, for all ω ∈ Ω. A frequently
considered alternative is to assign higher weights to poorer individuals so that the
function g : Ω→ R+ is decreasing. The following result is due to Sheshinski (1972).
Welfare-maximizing tax rate. The welfare-maximizing tax rate τ ∗ satisfies
τ ∗
1− τ ∗ = −
1
e
Cov
(
g(ω)
E[g (x)]
,
y∗ (ω)
E[y∗(x)]
)
, (14)
where e is the elasticity of the individual income y∗ (ω) with respect to the retention
rate 1− τ ∗.10
Formula (14) highlights the following forces. First, the optimal marginal tax rate is
decreasing in the elasticity of income e, which captures the efficiency costs of taxation.
Second, and most importantly for our purposes, it is determined by the social welfare
weights g (ω). Intuitively, for any given ω we have
g (ω) =
∂ SW(τ ∗)
∂ u(τ ∗, ω)
,
so that the term g(ω)E[g(x)] in equation (14) measures how much the planner values giving
an additional unit of consumption (or utility) to agent ω  relative to giving an
additional unit of consumption to everyone in the population. Now, the optimal tax
rate τ ∗ depends on the covariance between these weights11 and the agents' relative
positions in the income distribution as measured by y
∗(ω)
E[y∗(x)] . If the function g is
decreasing, the covariance in (14) is negative, so that τ ∗ > 0. The largest Pareto-
efficient tax rate (i.e., the top of the Laffer curve) is equal to τ ∗ = 1
e
and is optimal
for a Rawlsian planner with social welfare weights g (ω) = 0 for all ω > ω.
10Under the functional form ( 11), we have y
∗(ω)
E[y∗(x)] =
ω1+e
E[x1+e] , so that equation (14) gives the
welfare-maximizing tax rate in closed form as a function of the primitives of the model.
11More generally, with a strictly concave utility function, the weights g (ω) would be multiplied
in formula (14) by agent ω's marginal utility of consumption. In that case, even a utilitarian planner
would choose a strictly positive tax rate since the marginal utility is decreasing.
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2.1 Political equilibrium taxes
We now turn to the characterization of the tax rates that arise in a political equi-
librium. To this end, we use Proposition 1: party 1's problem is to maximize the
objective ψ1(τ 1, τ 2) defined in (10) and party 2's problem is to minimize this ex-
pression. Thus, if (τ 1, τ 2) is an equilibrium policy, then it is a saddle point of ψ.
Proposition 2 below shows that party 1's platform choice is the same as if it were
maximizing a welfare objective given by
E [ γ (ω) u (τ, ω) ], (15)
where the weighting function γ : Ω→ R+ is an endogenous object that we characterize
in closed-form in Proposition 2. Put differently, the political equilibrium tax policy
is given by a formula that looks formally like the one for welfare-maximizing taxes,
but with endogenous political weights γ (ω) as opposed to exogenous welfare weights
g(ω).
To highlight in the starkest possible way the novel insights implied by the en-
dogeneity of turnout, we focus on the two polar cases where the cost function is
either perfectly inelastic (µ → 0, exogenous turnout) or perfectly elastic (µ → ∞,
endogenous turnout).
Proposition 2 (Political weights). The tax policy τ eq that arises in the symmetric
equilibrium of the political game is given by formula (14), except that the social welfare
weights g (ω) are replaced by the political weights γ (ω) given by:
γ (ω) = q¯ (ω) b (0 | ω) (16)
if µ = 0, and
γ (ω) =
1
1 + ψ1∗
B (0 | ω) + ψ
1
∗
1 + ψ1∗
(1−B (0 | ω)) (17)
if µ→∞, where
ψ1∗ :=
E [
´ 0
−∞ |ε| dB(ε | ω) ]
E [
´∞
0
ε dB(ε | ω) ] . (18)
While (14) is a normative formula that describes the optimal level of redistribution
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for a given social welfare objective, Proposition 2 gives a positive formula for the
level of taxation. In particular, Proposition 2 has implications that can be tested
empirically. Before we turn to these testable predictions, we provide a more detailed
interpretation of the political weighting function γ (·).
Recall that party 1's objective ψ1(τ 1, τ 2), given by (10), is a weighted sum of three
auxiliary, and possibly competing, objectives: (i) maximizing its base, B1(τ 1, τ 2); (ii)
maximizing what is at stake for its own supporters, W 1(τ 1, τ 2); and (iii) minimizing
what is at stake for its opponent's supporters, W 2(τ 1, τ 2). We first study each of
these auxiliary objectives separately.
Maximal size of the base. Suppose first that party 1 only seeks to maximize
B1(τ 1, τ 2). This is also the true objective when turnout is exogenous, i.e., µ = 0.
Given this objective, what is the political return to marginally raising the utility of
agents with type ω? We know that equilibria are symmetric. So, to answer that
question, we take as a starting point a situation with τ 1 = τ 2, so that u(τ 1, ω) −
u(τ 2, ω) = 0 for all ω ∈ Ω. We then have
∂B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ u(τ 1, ω)
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τ2
= q¯(ω) b(0 | ω).
That is, starting from the equilibrium, the number of voters of type ω that party 1
can expect to attract by marginally raising their utility is equal to the total mass of
voters of that type, q¯(ω), times the fraction of these voters that are on the verge of
indifference between the two parties, b(0 | ω). This implies that it pays off for party
1 to place a higher weight on those types ω that have a higher participation rate and,
crucially, a larger number b (0 | ω) of marginal, or swing, voters. This swing voter
result is standard in probabilistic voting models with exogenous turnout (see, e.g.,
Lindbeck and Weibull (1987)).
Maximal mobilization of the base. Suppose now that party 1 only seeks to
mobilize its own supporters by maximizing what they have at stake in the election,
W 1(τ 1, τ 2). We repeat the thought experiment above for this new objective: starting
from a symmetric situation, the return to making agents with type ω marginally
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better off is given by
∂ W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ u(τ 1, ω)
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τ2
= B (0 | ω) .
That is, the return is given by the the fraction of supporters of party 1 in this group,
B (0 | ω). Therefore, party 1 has an incentive to place higher weight on those types
ω among which it has a larger number B (0 | ω) of inframarginal, or core, supporters.
Favoring these income groups is the most efficient way for party 1 to raise what its
supporters have at stake in the election and, therefore, to boost their turnout. This
core voter result, which strikingly contrasts with the swing voter result referred
to above, has antecedents in the political science literature, in particular in models
of indifference-based endogenous turnout (see, e.g., Cox and McCubbins (1986)).
Minimal mobilization of the opponent's base. Suppose finally that party 1
only seeks to demobilize its opponent's supporters by minimizing what they have at
stake in the election, W 2(τ 1, τ 2). We now have
∂ W 2(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ u(τ 1, ω)
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τ2
= − (1−B (0 | ω)) .
That is, if party 1's platform makes agents ω marginally better off, the aggregate
welfare benefit that party 2's ethical supporters could achieve by winning the election
would decline by the fraction of agents that favor party 2, 1 − B (0 | ω). Therefore,
party 1 assigns more weight to those types ω among which its opponent, party 2,
has a larger number 1 − B (0 | ω) of inframarginal, or core, supporters. Favoring
these income groups is the most efficient way for party 1 to lower what its opponent's
supporters have at stake in the election and, therefore, to restrain their turnout. The
importance of favoring the opposition's core voters has also been noted in the political
science literature (see, e.g., Erikson and Romero (1990)).
Resolution of the trade-off. How does party 1 resolve the trade-off between
these competing objectives? Suppose that turnout is endogenous with µ → ∞.
Then, all that matters is the trade-off between mobilization (maximizing W 1) and
demobilization (minimizing W 2). Catering marginally more to agents with type ω
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raises party 1's objective ψ1(τ 1, τ 2) = W
1(τ1,τ2)
W 2(τ1,τ2)
by
0 =
∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ u(τ 1, ω)
∣∣∣∣
τ1=τ2
∝
[
∂ W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ u(τ 1, ω)
+
W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
W 2(τ 1, τ 2)
×
(
−∂ W
2(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ u(τ 1, ω)
)]∣∣∣∣
τ1=τ2
.
Let τ eq be the equilibrium tax rate. An inspection of this formula shows that, in
equilibrium, the weight that party 1 places on the demobilization objective is given
by W
1(τeq ,τeq)
W 2(τeq ,τeq)
= ψ1(τ eq, τ eq) =: ψ1∗, thus leading to formula (17). Note that ψ
1
∗, given
by (18), depends only on the model's primitives, not on the actual equilibrium policy
τ eq proposed by both parties. The numerator of ψ1∗, E[
´ |ε| Iε<0dB], measures the
average intensity of the idiosyncratic party preferences ε < 0 among those who belong
to the base of party 1. The denominator, E[
´
ε Iε≥0dB], is the analogue for party 2.
Thus, if the supporters of party 1 (resp., party 2) care more than the opposition about
winning the election, because they have more at stake, then ψ1∗ > 1 (resp., ψ
1
∗ < 1).
Runner-up vs. front-runner. An implication of Proposition 2 is that, with en-
dogenous turnout, the relative weight that party 1 places on the demobilization ob-
jective, W 2, is given by ψ1∗ = ψ
1(τ eq, τ eq). Recall from Proposition 1 that there is an
increasing relationship between this parameter and party 1's probability of winning
the election. Formally, Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 imply that the odds of a victory
by party 1 are equal to P (ψ1∗), where P is the c.d.f. of the random variable η
2/η1.
Suppose that ψ1∗ is large, so that party 1 is the likely winner of the election. Our
analysis then implies that party 1 focuses primarily on minimizing what the core sup-
porters of the opposition have at stake, i.e., W 2. Intuitively, this is because catering
to the group that is unlikely to win (i.e., with small W 2) will lower its mobilization,
in percentage terms, by a larger amount than that of the likely winner (i.e., with large
W 1). Conversely, since party 2 is the runner-up, a symmetric analysis implies that it
runs on a platform that focuses mainly on maximizing what its own base has at stake,
i.e., W 1. Both parties cater to the same subset of the electorate, the core supporters
of the runner-up party, but with different motives. The front-runner wants to secure
an almost sure majority, while the runner-up seeks to boost the small probability of
a surprise victory.
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Implications for equilibrium taxes. To think through the implications of this
equilibrium characterization for taxes, we consider a more specific example. Sup-
pose that party 1 has little attachment from the rich. That is, the distribution of
idiosyncratic political preferences ε is skewed towards the left (ε < 0) for small values
of ω, and towards the right (ε > 0) for large values of ω, so that ω 7→ B (0 | ω) is
decreasing. Suppose moreover that party 1 has a high chance of winning the election.
Our analysis then predicts that party 1 will propose a policy that involves only small
tax distortions and little redistribution. Symmetrically, the disadvantaged party with
high attachment from the rich, party 2, also chooses to propose a moderate tax rate.
The latter does so in an attempt to increase the stakes for its supporters, the former
does so in order to undo this attempt. This observation rationalizes why even a more
left-leaning party  a party with a comparatively high support from voters with low
incomes  may shy away from heavier taxes. If the party is the likely winner of the
election, low taxes on the rich are valuable as they help to discourage the supporters of
the other, more right-leaning party. Only a left-leaning party with a small probability
of winning chooses to propose high taxes on the rich, and hence a large amount of
lump-sum redistribution, in order to raise the benefits that its own supporters would
realize in the unlikely event that it wins the election. The same logic can explain
why a more conservative or pro-market party that is supported to a large extent by
voters with above average incomes may not propose to abandon a progressive tax
system: if the party is the likely winner of the election, its focus is on weakening
the support for the competing leftist party. It therefore chooses a platform that is
appealing also to voters with below-average incomes. This comparative statics result
on party positions with respect to their ex-ante probability of winning the election is
our main novel result.
Political failures. It is possible that the political equilibrium weights γ (ω) are not
monotonically decreasing along the income distribution. This is the case, for instance,
in the model with exogenous turnout if the fraction of voters q¯ (ω) or the propensity
to swing given identical policies b (0 | ω) are not decreasing. This is also the case in
the model with endogenous turnout if the fraction of core supporters of the runner-up
party, B (0 | ω) or 1 − B (0 | ω), is not decreasing. In this situation, ceteris paribus,
the equilibrium tax policy will be regressive (i.e., less redistributive than utilitarian)
because each party j seeks to favor high incomes. This is either because the rich
are more likely to turn out to vote, or because they are more likely to swing to a
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competing party that offers a lower amount of redistribution, or because the core
supporters of the front-runner party are more numerous among poorer segments of
the electorate. Such a regressive tax policy would never be chosen by a benevolent
planner that allocates lower weights to agents with higher productivity in the social
objective. We then say that there is a political failure. To be clear, the equilibrium
policy is ex-post efficient in the set of linear tax policies, since γ(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω. It
is, however, inefficient in an ex-ante sense: a risk-averse representative agent behind
the veil of ignorance would be strictly better off with a higher tax rate.12
Equilibrium policies vs. best responses. Best responses can be analyzed along
similar lines as equilibrium policies. We show in the Online Appendix that for a given
policy τ 2 of party 2, the best response of party 1 is given by a formula identical to
(14), except that the political weights γ (ω) derived in (16) and (17) are replaced by
their off-equilibrium counterparts:
γ1(ω | τ 1, τ 2) = q¯ (ω) b (∆u | ω) (19)
if µ = 0, where ∆u is a shorthand for u(τ 1, ω)− u(τ 2, ω), and
1
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
B (∆u | ω) + ψ
1 (τ 1, τ 2)
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
(1−B (∆u | ω)) (20)
if µ→∞. To see how these expressions relate to the equilibrium tax in Proposition
2, note that τ 1 = τ 2 implies ∆u = 0 and hence γ1(ω | τ 1, τ 2) = γ (ω) for all ω.
Discussion. The seminal work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is known for its pre-
diction that the size of government should be an increasing function of the level of
inequality within the country, as measured by the ratio between median and average
income. The analysis is based on a Downsian model of political competition with
exogenous turnout. Empirical studies do not seem to support this prediction (see,
e.g., Perotti (1996); Bassett et al. (1999)). Our framework predicts that the outcome
of a political game is driven by different forces. Equilibrium taxes are shaped by the
fraction of swing voters at each income level, and by the fractions of core voters of
each party weighted by the ex-ante probability of winning the election.
12The distinction between ex ante, ex interim and ex post notions of efficiency is due to Holmström
and Myerson (1983)).
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Assessing whether campaign promises are primarily targeted at the swing voters
or the core voters of either party is the object of a substantial empirical literature
(see Cox (2009) for a survey).13 Our analysis implies that all of these channels should
be active empirically and, crucially, that the weight on each of them depends on the
ex-ante probability of a victory by the two parties. The recent paper by Bernhardt et
al. (2018) obtains, under certain conditions, a result with a similar flavor, but from
a different channel: in their model, turnout is exogenous and parties care not only
about their probability of winning but also their vote share. The literature is also
informative on how the terms that appear in equations (16) and (17) can be measured
empirically. For instance, the fraction of swing and core supporters of each party, as
well as the parties' odds of winning the election, can be obtained using poll data. In
Section 3 below, we provide more specific comparative statics results and illustrate
them in the context of German federal elections. In particular, we will discuss how
platform choices affect overall and relative turnout, and also how these effects can be
traced in the data that is provided by election studies and by quantitative analyses
of party positions.
2.2 Equilibrium turnout
So far we characterized the economic policy that emerges in equilibrium. We now
study equilibrium turnout. Parties in our model do not care about turnout per se:
they do only to the extent that it increases their probability of winning the election.
For this purpose, only the turnout advantage over the competing party is important,
i.e., parties prefer a large share in a small set of voters to a small share in a large set
of voters. The following corollary enables us to formalize this claim.
Corollary 1 (Equilibrium turnout). Suppose that µ→∞. We then have
σ1∗(p1, p2) =
W 1(p1, p2)
κB1(p1, p2)
ψ1(p1, p2) ρ(ψ1(p1, p2)) , (21)
where ρ(·) is the density function of the random variable η2/η1.
13Several papers have exploited cross-electoral district (and, to a lesser extent, individual-voter)
data to analyze this question. Evidence supporting the swing voter channel is provided by, e.g.,
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002); Stokes (2005). Evidence supporting the own-core voter channel is
provided by, e.g., Levitt and Snyder (1995); Calvo and Murillo (2004). Whether campaign promises
are also targeted to the opposition's core voters for demobilization purposes has been studied by,
e.g., Erikson and Romero (1990); Adams and Merrill III (2011).
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According to Corollary 1, if party 1 wanted to maximize the probability that its
supporters actually turn out to vote  rather than its probability of winning  it
would choose a policy p1 so as to maximize the right hand side of (21). Analogously,
if it wanted to maximize its number of voters, its objective would be σ1∗B1. In a
subgame perfect equilibrium, by contrast, it chooses p1 with the objective of maxi-
mizing ψ1(p1, p2). That is, in equilibrium parties have opportunities to increase their
turnout rates and overall turnout in their favor, but choose not to use them as this
would be detrimental for their probability of winning.
Previous analyses of ethical voter models by Coate and Conlin (2004) and Fed-
dersen and Sandroni (2006) have shown that overall turnout increases if elections
are close or if preferences over alternatives are more polarized. The observation that
closeness is conducive to overall turnout has a resemblance to the implication of equa-
tion (21) that turnout is increasing in the semi-elasticity of the probability of winning
with respect to ψ1, which is given by ψ1(p1, p2) ρ(ψ1(p1, p2)). A close race is one in
which this semi-elasticity is large: small changes in the proposed policies then have
large consequences for relative turnout and each party's probability of winning. It is
then implied by (21) that turnout tends to be larger if elections are close.14
3 Asymmetric demobilization in German elections
Our theoretical framework can be used to study the comparative statics of equilibrium
policies or, more generally, of the parties' best response policies and turnout rates
away from the equilibrium. At the level of generality of Sections 1 and 2, such an
analysis is limited, however. A more specific application can provide the guidance
to impose more structure on the general framework, which in turn makes it possible
to derive sharper predictions. In this section, we analyze through the lens of our
model the federal elections in Germany in the era of Angela Merkel, who centered
her campaign strategy on asymmetric demobilization. The effect of this strategy on
election outcomes and turnout rates is in line with the comparative statics predictions
of a more structured version of our model.
14The observations that equilibria are symmetric and that a deviation from equilibrium policies
would increase overall turnout can also be related to the finding in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006)
that polarization drives turnout. Our analysis shows that a lack of polarization leaves room for an
increase of overall turnout.
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3.1 A more specific model
We start by applying the theoretical framework of Sections 1 and 2 in the context of
German politics between 2005 and 2017. Merkel became the leader of the Christian
democrats (CDU, center-right) in 2000 and successfully ran for the chancellory in
2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017. Her main competitor was the Socialdemocratic Party
(SPD, center-left).
Policy space P. As in Section 2 we consider a policy space of linear income taxes
and let the variable ω index an individual's position in the income distribution. One
can interpret a redistributive policy platform τ j of party j either narrowly or broadly.
First, as in Meltzer and Richard (1981), the tax rate τ j can be interpreted as the
size of the government or of the welfare state, which includes income taxes and
monetary transfers but also social insurance, public education, etc. Second, τ j can
be interpreted more broadly as an index of the party's position on the left-right
axis, a higher value of τ j corresponding to a more leftist platform. In addition to the
previous variables, this broad index would also account for, e.g., the party's stance
on the minimum wage, gay marriage, or nuclear energy. While not strictly speaking
redistributive across incomes, these policy choices played an important role in Merkel's
campaign strategy discussed below.
Distribution of political biases B (·). By convention and without loss of gener-
ality, we interpret smaller values of ε as more liberal preferences, and larger values
of ε as more conservative preferences. Thus, we identify party 1 with the SPD, and
party 2 with the CDU: given identical policy platforms τ 1 = τ 2, party 1 (resp., party
2) is overly supported by voters with liberal preferences ε < 0 (resp., conservative
preferences ε > 0). In practice, these party preferences may be shaped by party iden-
tities, e.g., roots in the worker's movement or the Christian churches, or the cultural
milieu from which parties recruit their members. Party preferences may also reflect
fixed party positions that are not adjusted in the political campaign. For instance,
a salient issue in German politics in the Merkel era was whether families should be
supported by direct transfers, as advocated by the CDU, or by publicly-provided
childcare, as preferred by the SPD.
We assume that potential voters of the SPD have stronger preferences for redis-
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tributive policies than potential voters of the CDU.15 Therefore, we suppose that the
electorate of party 1 (SPD) is over-represented among the poor (i.e., low ω), while
party 2 (CDU) is over-represented among the rich (i.e., high ω). Thus, for the com-
parative statics analysis that follows, we take as a starting point policies (τ 1, τ 2) such
that:
(i) Party 1 has more potential voters with low incomes. Formally, the function
B(u(τ 1, ω)− u(τ 2, ω) | ω) is decreasing in ω.
Status quo policy τ 2. The 2005 election was an early election called by Merkel's
predecessor from the SPD, Gerhard Schröder. After an adoption of controversial labor
market reforms, the SPD had lost various state elections. When the 2005 election
was called, the CDU had a strong 21 percent lead over the SPD in opinion polls,
and was expected to become by far the strongest party. The CDU decided to run
on a pro-market platform, emphasizing the need for deregulation and lower taxes.
Over the course of the election campaign, however, the SPD recovered and in the
end the CDU won only by a tiny margin of victory: it was only 1 percent ahead of
the SPD. Notice that this outcome is consistent with the predictions of our model.
Because it was the clear front runner, the CDU would have maximized its chances
of victory by focusing on demobilizing the opposition, rather than mobilizing its own
electorate  i.e., by running on a redistributive platform more favorable to the SPD's
core supporters rather than taking a fiscally conservative stance to benefit its own
base. Therefore, the CDU's status quo policy τ 2 ahead of the 2009 election was too
far to the right, i.e.:
(ii) A slight increase in the status quo tax rate τ 2 would raise party 2's probability
of winning the election.
We show in the Online Appendix that this condition is satisfied if τ 2 is small enough,
or if it is below and close enough to the best response τ 2∗(τ 1) to party 1's policy.
15For instance, the election outcomes in 2009 and 2013 show the following pattern: the vote
shares of SPD and CDU among public servants and white collar workers were, by and large, in line
with the parties' overall vote shares, see Jung et al. (2010, 2015). Hence, in absolute numbers, the
CDU got more votes from these groups than the SPD. In relative terms, the CDU was stronger
among the self-employed and the SPD among workers. The CDU voters also tend to be older and
more formally educated. Thus, SPD voters benefit to a larger extent from redistributive policies.
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Odds of winning p¯i1(τ 1, τ 2). In 2009, the CDU was clearly headed for reelection.
The polls estimated that the CDU would get 35 percent of the votes, against 25
percent for the SPD and less than 15 percent for all the other parties. A week before
election day, Merkel traded at 1.08 (1/12) in the next Chancellor market on Betfair
 i.e., party 1 was given a chance of winning p¯i1(τ 1, τ 2) of 8 percent. This motivates
the following assumption:
(iii) Party 2 is the likely winner of the election, i.e., the probability that party 1
wins is p¯i1(τ 1, τ 2) < 1/2.
3.2 CDU's asymmetric demobilization strategy
The term asymmetric demobilization has been used to characterize Merkel's strategy
vis à vis her main competitor (SPD) from 2009 onward.16 This strategy is associated
with Matthias Jung, an advisor of Angela Merkel and the head of the Forschungs-
gruppe Wahlen research institute that studies elections in Germany. He published on
the rationale for this delibrate strategy and its impact on voting behavior and elec-
tion outcomes: see Jung et al. (2010, 2015); Jung (2019). For an account in English
language, see Schmidt (2014).
Definition and chronology. After the federal election in 2005 the CDU adopted
the strategy of asymmetric demobilization. What defines this strategy is an avoidance
of controversial positions or even an adoption of the rival's position in an attempt to
lower the turnout of its potential voters. This strategy was successful and continued
during the 2013 and 2017 campaigns. The clearest illustration is given by the 2013
official CDU program, which included many policies traditionally advocated by the
SPD including the creation of a minimum wage, rent control in tight city areas, a
financial transactions tax, a floor on pensions, or tax credits for families and single
mothers. In addition, in 2011 Merkel had announced a plan to shut down all nuclear
reactors by 2022, a measure traditionally favored by the left-leaning Green party.
In 2017, the CDU avoided controversial topics on economic and social policy, and
Merkel initiated a parliamentary decision on the question of gay marriage that her
SPD opponent had made a central campaign issue  at the cost of alienating her own
base. Narrative records of this strategy abound in the national and international press.
16It seems that the term asymmetric demobilization had its first appearance in an analysis of a
regional election in Catalonia, see Lago et al. (2007).
27
To give but one example, Josef Joffe, a well-known German journalist, commented
on the CDU's strategy in 2013: Ms Merkel's plan is to lull the other side; don't rile
them and win by keeping them at home. How did she do it after the near-disaster of
2005? By shifting to the left. An apostle of free markets and low taxes ten years ago,
Merkel simply outflanked the left on the left ... She is the best Social Democrat the
SPD could have asked for.17 While such journalistic documentation of the CDU's
asymmetric demobilization strategy is overwhelming, it is also apparent in systematic
quantitative analyses of party positions by political scientists, as we now describe.
Data sources. The Manifesto Project, see Volkens et al. (2018), provides a quanti-
tative text analysis of party manifestos. The text is split into quasi-sentences, units of
text that contain one political statement. Quasi-sentences are then assigned to cate-
gories such as Free Market Economy, Market Regulation, Welfare State Expansion or
Welfare State Limitation.18 Following our discussion of the policy space P discussed
in Section 3.1, we focus on two such indices. See Volkens et al. (2018) for a detailed
description of the data set and the methodology.19
First, we use the Welfare State index, which corresponds to our narrower interpre-
tation of a policy platform τ j. This index aggregates all of the favourable mentions of
the need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or social security
scheme ... for example: government funding of health care, child care, elder care and
pensions, social housing; and of equality: concept of social justice and the need for
fair treatment of all people. Second, we use the Right-Left index, which corresponds
to our broader interpretation of a policy platform τ j. This index positions a party
manifesto on a one-dimensional policy space by taking the share of quasi-sentences
that are indicative of rightist positions (e.g., favorable mentions of military, freedom
and human rights, constitutionalism, political authority, free market economy, incen-
tives, economic orthodoxy, welfare state limitation, national way of life, traditional
morality, law and order, civic mindedness) and substracts the share of quasi-sentences
17Financial times, 08-05-2013.
18The overall analysis is not restricted to economic policy dimensions, but also contains categories
for positions on foreign policy, migration, political corruption and others.
19An alternative data source is the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, see Polk et al. (2017); Bakker et al.
(2015). It also provides an analysis of party positions in various dimensions, including a left-versus-
right positioning for economic policy issues. It differs from the Manifesto Project in that it is based
on a survey of expert opinions as opposed to the text of party manifestos. This data set does not
yet cover the most recent federal election in Germany in 2017. For the elections between 2002 and
2013 it shows the same pattern as the Party Manifesto data.
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that are indicative of leftist positions (e.g., favorable mentions of anti-imperialism,
peace, internationalism, democracy, economic planning, protectionism, nationaliza-
tion, welfare state expansion, education expansion, labor groups).
Results. The table below describes how the positions of the CDU and the SPD
evolved according to the two indices from the Manifesto Project for the federal elec-
tions since 2002. Both indices are normalized to 1 for the SPD in 2002. Larger
(resp., smaller) values of the Welfare State index mean that the party's manifesto
puts stronger (resp., weaker) emphasis on the expansion of the welfare state. Larger
(resp., smaller) values of the Right-Left index mean that the party's manifesto is
located further to the right (resp., left). This table shows clearly that the party po-
sitions diverged between the 2002 and 2005 elections. While the SPD reinforced its
emphasis on welfare state expansion (the Welfare State index increased from 1 to
1.49) and overall moved further to the left (the Right-Left index decreased from 1 to
−0.53), instead the CDU advocated a smaller welfare state (the corresponding index
decreased from 0.85 to 0.58) and overall moved further to the right (the corresponding
index increased from 5.06 to 6.25). From 2009 onwards, instead, the CDU moved to
the left according to both indices: the welfare state index increased continuously from
0.58 in 2005 to 1.08 in 2017, and the right-left index decreased from 6.26 in 2005 to
0.67 in 2017. The two parties moved in parallel: when the SPD moved to the left,
so did the CDU. Notice that according to both indices, the CDU was substantially
more left-leaning in 2017 than the SPD was in 2002.
Welfare State Right-Left
SPD CDU SPD CDU
2002 1 0.85 1 5.06
2005 1.49 0.58 -0.53 6.25
2009 1.76 0.74 -4.46 2.13
2013 2.14 0.83 -5.75 0.63
2017 1.83 1.08 -5.23 0.67
3.3 Analysis of turnout and election outcomes
In this section we analyze the impact of the CDU's asymmetric demobilization strat-
egy on turnout rates and election results. Our goal is to confront the comparative
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statics predictions of our model with the outcomes of German elections from 2009 to
2017.
Comparative statics predictions. A major insight of our theoretical analysis is
that a party that is leading in the polls has an incentive to adopt a platform that is
appealing to the core supporters of its competitor. Thereby the potential voters of the
competitor are demobilized. Corollary 2 below is an adaptation of this finding to the
German context described above. For convenience, we invoke additional functional
form assumptions.
Assumption 2. Idiosyncratic party biases ε follow a uniform distribution at each
income level: for any ω ∈ Ω there exist B (ω) ∈ (0, 1) and b (ω) > 0 such that20
B (x | ω) = B (ω) + b (ω)x.
Under Assumption 2, if both parties make the same proposal, so that τ 1 = τ 2 and
hence u(τ 1, ω)− u(τ 2, ω) = 0, then B(u(τ 1, ω)− u(τ 2, ω) | ω) = B (ω). Thus, B (ω)
captures party 1's strength in the subset of type-ω citizens when the parties propose
the same policies. Thus, it is a measure of its core supporters. Analogously, 1−B (ω)
is a measure of party 2's core supporters. The parameter b (ω), by contrast, measures
the fraction of swing supporters of type ω.
Assumption 3. The random variables η1 and η2, defined in Assumption 1, are uni-
formly distributed on an interval [1− δ, 1 + δ] with δ > 0.
As the proof in the Online-Appendix makes clear, Assumptions 2 and 3 are suffi-
cient, but by no means necessary, to obtain our next result.
Corollary 2 (Asymmetric demobilization). Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3
and Conditions (i)-(iii) above are satisfied. Then a slight increase in party 2's tax
rate τ 2 has the following implications. Party 2's expected vote share increases. Overall
turnout decreases. The demobilization is asymmetric, i.e., the relative turnout ratio
σ1∗/σ2∗ of parties 1 and 2 decreases.
In the remainder of this section we confront the theoretical predictions in Corollary
2 with the election outcomes in Germany.
20Whenever we invoke this assumption, we assume that the support of the distribution is suffi-
ciently wide so that all the values of x = u(τ1, ω)− u(τ2, ω) that we are concerned with fall in the
interior of the domain of B(· | ω).
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Empirical election outcomes. As we discussed above, the strategy of asymmetric
demobilization was adopted in the 2009, 2013 and 2017 elections in response to the
2005 experience, in which Merkel learned that running on a platform that appeals to
the core voters of her own party could jeopardize an almost sure victory. This strategy
paid off: despite a similar lead in the polls in 2009, her margin of victory over the
SPD increased from 1 percent in 2005 to more than 10 percent. Overall turnout (70.8
percent) went down by 6.9 percentage points compared to the 2005 election, and was
at an all-time low. Crucially, turnout was lower among potential SPD voters than
among potential CDU voters: 52 percent of the potential SPD voters indeed voted
for the SPD, whereas 62 percent of the potential CDU voters voted for the CDU, see
Jung et al. (2010); Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2013b,a).21
In 2013, the CDU moved further left in parallel with the SPD. The election out-
come was again a great success for the CDU: it gained 41.5 percent of the votes, was
close to an absolute majority in parliament, and was 16 percent ahead of the SPD.
Again, mobilization was asymmetric: turnout was 51 percent among the potential
SPD voters and 69 percent among the potential CDU voters, see Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen (2015). In 2017, the rise of a right-wing populist party implied large losses for
the CDU relative to the 2013 election. The SPD also lost, however, and so the CDU
stayed more than 12 percent ahead of the SPD. Moreover, it defended its dominant
position in the German party system: as the only party with more than 30 percent of
the votes, every realistic option for government formation had the CDU in the lead-
ing role with Merkel as the chancellor. Again, turnout of potential CDU voters (60
percent) was much higher than the turnout of the potential SPD voters (44 percent),
see Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (2018). Overall turnout was slightly higher in 2013
and somewhat higher in 2017 than it was in 2009, at 76 percent, but still lower than
any turnout ratio observed prior to 2009.
These outcomes are all consistent with our theoretical comparative statics predic-
tions of Corollary 2.
21These numbers are obtained in the following way: The research institute Forschungsgruppe
Wahlen runs a monthly survey with a representative sample of voters. The study is known as the
Politbarometer. Shortly before an election it includes questions on prospective voting behavior. A
person who plans to vote SPD or who includes the SPD in the set of conceivable parties is considered
a potential SPD voter. Likewise for the CDU. The ratio of actual to potential voters then gives the
numbers of 62 percent for the CDU and of 52 percent of the SPD. As a caveat, note that the
Politbarometer is not a panel; i.e., it is not tracking the actual voting behavior of the participants
in the survey.
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4 Nonlinear income taxation
In this section, we extend our analysis of equilibrium tax rates to non-linear tax sched-
ules. We show that our equilibrium characterization for linear taxes carries over to the
non-linear setting, in the following sense: the political equilibrium is formally given
by the same formula as the one that would be chosen by a benevolent social plan-
ner, except that the social welfare weights are again replaced by the political weights
introduced in Proposition 2. The formal arguments in the Appendix are different
though. The set of non-linear income tax schedules is an infinite-dimensional policy
space, so that we need to involve functional derivatives. Moreover, the conditions for
equilibrium existence are more restrictive.
As in our analysis of linear taxes, preferences of taxpayers are given by (11). A
redistributive tax policy proposed by party j now consists of a twice continuously
differentiable function T j : R+ → R that assigns a tax payment T j (y) to any level
of pre-tax-income y. An admissible policy platform T j must balance the government
budget, i.e.,
E[T j(yj (ω))] = 0, (22)
where yj (ω) the pre-tax labor income of agent ω chosen under tax schedule T j. We
denote by u(T j, ω) denote the utility of agent ω realized under this policy.
Equilibrium existence. The following lemma provides sufficient conditions on
primitives ensuring the existence, uniqueness, and symmetry of a pure-strategy equi-
librium when turnout is endogenous.
Lemma 4 (Equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and symmetry). Let µ→∞.
Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and that there are α > 0 and β > 0 such that
B (ω) ∈ [1
2
−α, 1
2
+α] and b (ω) ≤ β for all ω. Then there exists a unique equilibrium.
This equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., T 1 = T 2.
The assumptions of Lemma 4 imply that the race between the two parties is
close, in the sense that both parties attract close to half of the electorate when they
make the same proposal. They also imply that the distribution of idiosyncratic party
preferences has a wide support, that is, b (ω) is sufficiently small. These distributional
assumptions primarily serve to simplify the analysis and are stronger than necessary:
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the equilibrium conditions are continuous in these parameters so that there is a range
of close enough distributions for which they are also fulfilled.
The proof in the Appendix involves the following steps. First, we use func-
tional derivatives to derive first-order conditions that characterize the parties' best
responses. This gives us an equilibrium candidate. Second, we show that, under the
conditions stated in Lemma 4, this equilibrium candidate satisfies also the second-
order conditions. Thus, parties have no incentive to deviate locally. Finally, we invoke
the contraction mapping theorem to show that, under the conditions in Lemma 4,
there is one and only one intersection of the parties' best response functions. Hence,
there is no incentive to deviate to a policy that is not in a neighborhood of the
equilibrium candidate.
Welfare-maximization. Again, we start by describing as a benchmark the policy
that a benevolent social planner would choose. The following result is due to Diamond
(1998).
Welfare-maximizing tax schedule. The welfare-maximizing tax schedule T ∗ sat-
isfies
T ∗′ (y∗ (ω))
1− T ∗′ (y∗ (ω)) =
(
1 +
1
e
) 1− F (ω)
ωf (ω)
{
1− E
[
g(x′)
E[g(x)]
| x′ ≥ ω
]}
. (23)
Formula (23) shows that optimal marginal taxes are, as in the linear case, decreas-
ing in the intensity of behavioral responses to taxation as measured by the elasticity
e. Also, the shape of the tax schedule is driven by the inverse hazard ratio of the wage
distribution, 1−F (ω)
ωf(ω)
. This term highlights an equity-efficiency tradeoff. It relates the
mass 1 − F (ω) of people who pay a higher tax liability after a slight increase in the
marginal tax rate at income y∗ (ω) (i.e., the number of agents with income y ≥ y∗ (ω))
to the fraction f(ω) of people whose incentives to exert effort are worsening after such
an increase. Finally, as for linear taxation, the social welfare weights g(ω) shape the
optimal tax schedule. These weights reflect inequality aversion if the function g is
decreasing. With g decreasing, optimal marginal taxes are, ceteris paribus, higher for
higher incomes.
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Political equilibrium tax schedule. We finally turn to the analysis of the po-
litical competition game between two parties. Taking as given the opponent's policy
T 2, the best response problem of party 1 is to choose a policy T 1 that maximizes
the objective ψ1(T 1, T 2) defined in (10) subject to the budget constraint (22). Party
2 solves the analogous problem. In equilibrium, the two parties tax schedules are
mutually best responses.
Proposition 3 (Political equilibrium nonlinear tax policy). The equilibrium
tax policy is given by formula (23), except that the social welfare weights g(ω) are
replaced by the political weights γ(ω) defined by (16) if µ = 0 and by (17)-(18) if
µ→∞.
Proposition 3 shows that the equilibrium tax schedule is given by a formula that
is formally identical to the one that would be chosen by a benevolent planner with a
social welfare objective that allocates the weights γ (ω) on agents with wage ω. These
weights are identical and hence have the same interpretation and economic implica-
tions as in the affine case. In other words, the political economy forces determine the
relevant Pareto weights that appear in the tax formulas, but keep unchanged all of
the other insights that the public finance literature has derived.
5 Conclusion: generalized social welfare weights
The theory of optimal taxation characterizes the tax policy that would be chosen
by a benevolent social planner with the objective to maximize social welfare. How-
ever, there are many reasonable social welfare functions. The literature then often
refers to society's social welfare function as the relevant one but typically fails to
provide a precise formulation of how society would come to agree on a given social
welfare function. Still there are attempts to identify society's social welfare function
empirically. The idea is to use the formulas for welfare-maximizing taxation, data
on the tax system, the earnings distribution and labor supply elasticities to map out
society's social welfare weights; see, e.g., Blundell et al. (2009). Bargain et al. (2011),
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012), Zoutman, Jacobs and Jongen (2016) or Lockwood
and Weinzierl (2016).
Our characterization of political equilibrium taxes provides a different interpreta-
tion of the weights that can be mapped out given data on the tax system, the earnings
distribution and labor supply elasticities. This interpretation, moreover, depends on
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whether turnout in elections is viewed as exogenous or endogenous. With exogenous
turnout, the weights reflect the political return to attracting swing voters. With en-
dogenous turnout, they reflect the political return to mobilizing the own base and
the political return to demobilizing the base of the competing party, as well as their
interaction with the parties' odds of winning the election. This difference between
the cases of exogenous and endogenous turnout raises the question which of these
interpretations is more plausible.22 We used our model to analyze the federal elec-
tions in Germany in the era of Angela Merkel to argue that the endogenous turnout
played an important role. The core of Merkel's strategy was to deliberately demo-
bilize the base of her main competitor. This strategy paid off: her party increased
its margin of victory after the strategy of asymmetric demobilization was adopted.
Moreover, it gained a relative turnout advantage: the potential voters of Merkel's
party turned out in larger fractions than the potential voters of the main competi-
tor (social-democrats). Finally, overall turnout went down. These observations are
consistent with the comparative static predictions of our model for the endogenous
turnout case.
A broader message is that it makes little sense to let the data speak about what
society's social welfare function looks like without at the same time having an expla-
nation for how society would come to settle on a specific social welfare function. In
fact, Arrow's impossibility shows that it may be entirely infeasible to aggregate indi-
vidual preferences over tax policies into a social welfare function. What is feasible,
by contrast, is to reinterpret any process that selects a tax schedule from the set of
Pareto-efficent tax schedules as if it was the choice of an agent with preferences over
the set of Pareto-optima, see Samuelson (1967). Saez and Stantcheva (2016) recog-
nize that observed tax policies are not entirely driven by welfare considerations, but
also by non-welfarist value judgments or political economy forces. They propose to
capture these forces by means of generalized social welfare functions. Thus, observed
tax policies are interpreted as if there had been an agent who made a selection from
the set of Pareto optima and who used a generalized social welfare function for this
purpose.
We have shown that political equilibrium tax policies can be characterized by for-
mulas akin to those for welfare-maximizing tax systems. Thus, we provide a detailed
and microfounded proof of concept that political economy forces can be captured by
22Note that our general model with µ ∈ (0,∞) has all of these channels active simultaneously.
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political weights, that is, by specific generalized social welfare weights that emerge in
the political process. We have also shown that political equilibrium outcomes may
be incompatible with the maximization of a concave social welfare function. General-
ized social welfare weights are therefore needed. Conventional social welfare weights
cannot capture such political failures.
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A Proofs of Section 1
Proof of equation (6). The total number of votes for party 1 is a random variable
equal to
V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) = E[σ1q˜1(ω)B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] =: σ1B˜1(p1, p2). (24)
Analogously, the total number of votes for party 2 equals
V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2) = E[σ2q˜2(ω)(1−B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω))] =: σ2B˜2(p1, p2). (25)
Given two party proposals p1 and p2, and given the turnout for party 2, σ2, the best
response problem of the rule-utilitarian supporters of party 1 is to choose σ1 so as to
maximize the expected value of the following expression
I
{
V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) ≥ V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2)
}
E [B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)u(p1, ω)]
+
(
1− I
{
V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) ≥ V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2)
})
×
E
[
B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)u(p2, ω) + ´ u(p1,ω)−u(p2,ω)−∞ ε b(ε | ω)dε
]
− k(σ1) E[q˜1(ω)B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)].
In this expression, I is an indicator function and the product
I
{
V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) ≥ V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2)
}
E
[
B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)u(p1, ω)]
is utilitarian welfare realized by the supporters of party 1 in the event that their party
1 wins. Analogously,
(1− I {·})E
[
B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)u(p2, ω) +
ˆ u(p1,ω)−u(p2,ω)
−∞
ε b(ε | ω)dε
]
is utilitarian welfare realized by the supporters of party 1 in the event that party 2
wins, where the integral term in this expression is the sum of the gains (or losses)
that the supporters of party 1 realize because of their idiosyncratic party preference.
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Voting costs do not depend on which party wins the election. Upon exploiting the
linearity of the expectations operator and dropping terms that do not depend on σ1,
we can equivalently write this optimization problem as follows: choose σ1 ∈ [0, 1] to
maximize
pi1(p1, p2, σ1, σ2)W 1(p1, p2)− k(σ1)B1(p1, p2), (26)
where pi1(p1, p2, σ1, σ2) is the probability that V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) ≥ V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2),
W 1(p1, p2) is defined by (3) and captures the welfare gain that is realized by the
supporters of party 1 if their party wins, and B1(p1, p2) is defined by (1) and captures
the expected value of the mass of group-rule-utilitarian supporters of party 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. Using equations (24) and (25), we easily obtain that given p1
and p2, the probability that party 1 wins the election is equal to the probability of
the event
σ1
σ2
≥ B˜
2(p1, p2)
B˜1(p1, p2)
.
Given p1 and p2, denote by P(· | p1, p2) the c.d.f. and by p(· | p1, p2) the density of
the random variable B˜
2(p1,p2)
B˜1(p1,p2)
. Thus,
pi1(p1, p2, σ1, σ2) = P
(
σ1
σ2
| p1, p2
)
. (27)
We take the party platforms p1 and p2 as given and characterize equilibrium turnout.
We say that the turnout subgame has an interior equilibrium if 0 < σ1∗(p1, p2) < 1
and 0 < σ2∗(p1, p2) < 1. An interior equilibrium is characterized by the first-order
conditions
pi1σ1(·)W 1(p1, p2)− κ
(
σ1
)1/µ
B1(p1, p2) = 0, (28)
and
− pi1σ2(·)W 2(p1, p2)− κ
(
σ2
)1/µ
B2(p1, p2) = 0. (29)
Using equation (27), these first order conditions can also be written as
p
(
σ1
σ2
| p1, p2
)
σ1
σ2
1
σ1
W 1(p1, p2)− κ (σ1)1/µB1(p1, p2) = 0, (30)
and
p
(
σ1
σ2
| p1, p2
)
σ1
σ2
1
σ2
W 2(p1, p2)− κ (σ2)1/µB2(p1, p2) = 0. (31)
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Equations (30) and (31) allow us to pin down the equilibrium value of relative turnout,
Rσ(p1, p2) :=
σ1∗(p1, p2)
σ2∗(p1, p2)
=
[
W 1(p1, p2)/B1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)/B2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
, (32)
as had to be shown.
Proof of Lemma 2. Under Assumption 1,
B˜1(p1, p2) = η1B1(p1, p2) and B˜2(p1, p2) = η2B2(p1, p2).
The probability that party 1 wins the election is therefore equal to the probability of
the event
σ1η1B1(p1, p2) ≥ σ2η2B2(p1, p2)
or, equivalently,
σ1
σ2
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
≥ η
2
η1
.
Let P be the c.d.f. of the random variable η2/η1. Then this probability can be written
as
p¯i1(p1, p2) = P
(
σ1(p1, p2)
σ2(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
)
.
Lemma 1 then implies that with an interior equilibrium of the participation sub-
game, the probability that party 1 wins the election is a non-decreasing function of
Rσ(p1, p2)RB(p1, p2). Therefore, party 1's objective is to maximize this expression
and party 2's objective is to minimize it.
Proof of Proposition 1. Lemma 2 implies that Party 1 seeks to maximize
Rσ(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
=
[
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
[
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
] 1
1+µ
and that party 2 seeks to minimize this expression, where the equality follows from
equation (32). This immediately leads to equation (10).
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B Proof of Lemma 3: Equilibrium existence with a
one-dimensional policy space
In this section we establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium
for a model with a one-dimensional policy space, assuming that policy preferences
are single-peaked and represented by a strictly concave utility function. We provide
the following characterization: in equilibrium both parties propose the policy that
maximizes the generalized social welfare function E[γ(ω)u(p, ω)], where the weights
{γ(ω)}ω∈Ω are determined by the equilibrium analysis below.
Setup. Let the policy space P be a an interval of real numbers, P = [p, p] ⊂ R. Sup-
pose that preferences over policies are single-peaked.23 Let p∗(ω) = argmaxp∈P u(p, ω)
be the ideal policy for voter type ω. We assume, moreover, that the voters' utility
functions u(·, ω) are twice differentiable and concave. Moreover, we assume that ideal
policies lie in the interior of P and satisfy the first order condition u1(p
∗(ω), ω) = 0.
Assuming for simplicity that µ→∞, the objective of party 1 is to maximize
ψ1(p1, p2) =
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
and the objective of party 2 is to minimize this expression. Focusing on this case
simplifies the exposition, but as we clarify below the argument does not depend on it
and extends to any value of µ. Let ∆u(p1, p2, ω) = u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) and recall that
W 1(p1, p2) = E
[
G1W (∆u(p
1, p2, ω) | ω)]
W 2(p1, p2) = E
[
G2W (∆u(p
1, p2, ω) | ω)]
where we denote by
G1W (x | ω) :=
ˆ x
−∞
(x− ε) b(ε | ω)dε
G2W (x | ω) :=
ˆ ∞
x
(ε− x) b(ε | ω)dε.
23As is well-known, on the assumption that all citizens participate in elections, this property
implies that the median voter's preferred policy is a Condorcet winner, i.e., it wins a majority in
any pairwise vote against an alternative from P.
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Note that the derivatives of the functions G1W (· | ω) and G2W (· | ω) are respectively
given by
g1W (x | ω) := B(x | ω)
g2W (x | ω) := − (1−B(x | ω)) .
Results. We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 3.
Lemma 5 (Best responses exist and are interior). For any p2 ∈ P, there is a
best response of party 1. Any best response of party 1 lies in the interior of P and
satisfies the first order condition ψ11(p
1, p2) = 0, where ψ11 is the partial derivative
of ψ1 with respect to p1. Analogously, for any p2 ∈ P there is a best response of
party 2. Any best response of party 2 is interior and satisfies the first order condition
ψ12(p
1, p2) = 0.
Proof. We only prove the statements referring to the best responses of party 1. For
any p2, the function ψ1(·, p2) is continuous in p1 and therefore attains a maximum on
the compact policy space P = [p, p]. The function ψ1(·, p2) is, moreover, differentiable.
To prove that the maximum is interior and satisfies first-order conditions we show
that, for any p2,
ψ11(p, p
2) > 0 and ψ11(p, p
2) < 0 .
Given p2, the derivative of ψ1(·, p2) with respect to p1 can be written as
ψ11(p
1, p2) =
1
W 2(p1, p2)
E
[
g1W (∆u(·) | ω)u1(p1, ω)
]
− W
1(p1, p2)
(W 2(p1, p2))2
E
[
g2W (∆u(·) | ω)u1(p1, ω)
]
=
1 + ψ1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p1, ω)
]
where
γ1(ω | p1, p2) = 1
1 + ψ1(p1, p2)
B(∆u(·) | ω) + ψ
1(p1, p2)
1 + ψ1(p1, p2)
(1−B(∆u(·) | ω)) .
Let p1 = p, then u1(p
1, ω) > 0 for all ω and hence ψ11(p
1, p2) > 0. Analogously, if
p1 = p, then u1(p
1, ω) < 0 for all ω and hence ψ11(p
1, p2) < 0.
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Lemma 6 (Best responses are continuous). For given p2, let p1∗(p2) be a solution
to the first order condition ψ11(p
1, p2). Then p1∗ is a continuous function.
Proof. The implicit function theorem can be applied to the first-order condition for
party 1 and implies that p1∗ is a differentiable, and hence continuous, function of
p2.
Lemma 7 (Existence and uniqueness of fixed point). The function p1∗ has one
and only one fixed point.
Proof. The function p1∗ is a continuous function from P to P, where P is a non-
empty, compact and convex set. Therefore, it has a fixed point by Brouwer's fixed
point theorem. This proves existence. To establish uniqueness, let (p1, p2) be such a
fixed point. It satisfies ψ11(p
1, p2) = 0, i.e.,
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p1, ω)
]
= 0 ,
and
p1 = p2 .
These two equations uniquely pin down p1. To see this, note first that p1 = p2 implies
∆u(p1, p2, ω) = 0 for all ω and that γ1(ω | p1, p2) depends on p1 and p2 only via
∆u(p1, p2, ω). Let γ(ω) be the corresponding value of γ1(ω | p1, p2), i.e.,
γ(ω) :=
1
1 + ψ1∗
B(0 | ω) + ψ
1
∗
1 + ψ1∗
(1−B(0 | ω)) , with ψ1∗ :=
E [G1W (0 | ω)]
E [G2W (0 | ω)]
Then p1 solves
α(p1) := E
[
γ(ω) u1(p
1, ω)
]
= 0 .
To see that this equation has a unique solution, note that the auxiliary function
α(p1) is differentiable, and decreasing as α′(p1) = E [γ(ω) u11(p1, ω)] < 0. Moreover,
α(p) > 0 and α(p) < 0. Thus, there is one and only one solution to the equation
α(p1) = 0.
Lemma 8. The best response functions p1∗ and p2∗ have the same fixed points.
Proof. As argued above, (p1, p2) is a fixed point of p1∗ if it satisfies
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p1, ω)
]
= 0 (33)
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and
p1 = p2 . (34)
Given p1, the best responses of party 2, p2∗(p1) is obtained as the solution to
min
p2∈P
ψ1(p1, p2)
and solves the first-order condition
ψ12(p
1, p2) = −1 + ψ
1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p2, ω)
]
= 0 .
Thus, a fixed point (p1, p2) of p2∗ satisfies
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p2, ω)
]
= 0 , (35)
and
p1 = p2 . (36)
If it satisfies these equations, then it also satisfies (33) and (34) and hence is a fixed
point of p1∗. Conversely, if it satisfies (33) and (34), then it also satisfies (35) and
(36) so that any fixed point of p1∗ is also a fixed point p2∗.
Proof of Lemma 3. We can now complete the proof of Lemma 3. The policy that
maximizes E [γ(ω) u(p, ω)] satisfies the first order condition
E [γ(ω) u1(p, ω)] = 0 .
It follows from Lemmas 7 and (8) that this policy is both a fixed point of party 1's
best response function and a fixed point of party 2's best response function. Thus, if
both parties propose this policy they are giving mutually best responses. It remains
to be shown that there can be no other equilibrium. To arrive at a contradiction,
suppose that (p1, p2) is an alternative equilibrium. Then, p1 is a best response to p2
which implies that the first-order condition
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p1, ω)
]
= 0 (37)
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is satisfied. Analogously, p2 is a best response to p1 and this implies that
E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p2, ω)
]
= 0 . (38)
If we assume that p1 = p2, these conditions imply that both parties propose the policy
that maximizes E [γ(ω) u(p, ω)]. Assume therefore that p1 6= p2. But then there must
be two different values of p that solve
α˜(p) = 0
where the auxiliary function α˜ is such that
α˜(p) := E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u1(p, ω)
]
.
Note that
α˜′(p) := E
[
γ1(ω | p1, p2) u11(p, ω)
]
< 0 ,
α˜(p) > 0 and α˜(p) < 0. Thus, there is one and only one value of p satisfying α˜(p) = 0,
a contradiction.
General Objective, 0 < µ < ∞. The preceding argument uses that W 1(·) and
W 2(·) depend on p1 and p2 only via ∆u(p1, p2, ω) = u(p1, ω) − u(p2, ω) and the
derivatives of the objective function can be written as a weighted sum of the different
types' marginal utilities, where the weights are all positive. These properties remain
intact with a more general objective function of the form
ψ1(p1, p2) =
1
1 + µ
ln
(
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
)
+
µ
1 + µ
ln
(
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
)
.
For instance, the best response condition ψ11(p
1, p2) = 0 for party 1 can then be
written as
E
[
γ1,µ(ω | p1, p2) u1(p1, ω)
]
= 0 ,
where
γ1,µ(ω | p1, p2) = 1
1+µ
q¯(ω) b(· | ω) + µ
1+µ
(
1
B1(·) +
1
B2(·)
)−1
γ1(ω | p1, p2).
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Weakening concavity. If we drop the assumption that u11(p, ω) < 0, for all p and
ω, but keep the assumptions u1(p, ω) > 0 and u1(p, ω) > 0, for all ω, we can no longer
prove uniqueness. The arguments for the existence of the symmetric equilibrium
go through, however. This observation is relevant because a generic version of the
linear tax model gives us u1(p, ω) > 0 and u1(p, ω) < 0, for all ω, but not necessarily
concavity. By contrast, a spatial model of political competition in which voters have
bliss points and a quadratic loss function will give rise to strict concavity. In this
paper, we focus on an equilibrium that exists for any generic linear tax model and
this equilibrium is unique under ancillary conditions.
C Proofs of Sections 2 and 3
Proof of equation (14). The individual optimization problem reads
max
y
U ((1− τ) y +R, y;ω) .
The first order condition is given by
(1− τ)U1 ((1− τ) y (ω) +R, y (ω) ;ω) + U2 ((1− τ) y (ω) +R, y (ω) ;ω) = 0.
The implicit function theorem leads to
∂y (ω)
∂ (1− τ) = −
U1 + [(1− τ)U11 + U12] y (ω)
(1− τ)2 U11 + 2 (1− τ)U12 + U22
.
We define the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with respect to the retention
rate by
e (ω) :=
1− τ
y (ω)
∂y (ω)
∂ (1− τ) .
The envelope theorem implies
∂
∂τ
U ((1− τ) y (ω) +R (τ) , y (ω) ;ω) =
(
−y (ω) + ∂R (τ)
∂τ
)
U1 (c (ω) , y (ω) ;ω) .
Now, the government optimization problem reads
max
τ,R
E [g (ω)U ((1− τ) y (ω) +R, y (ω) ;ω)] ,
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subject to the budget balance constraint
R = τE [y (ω)] .
The first-order condition of this problem is given by
0 = E
[
g (ω)U1 (c (ω) , y (ω) ;ω)
(
−y (ω) + E [y (ω)] + τE
[
∂y (ω)
∂τ
])]
,
which yields
τE
[
y(ω)
1−τ e (ω)
]
E [y (ω)]
= − E [g (ω)U1 (c (ω) , y (ω) ;ω) y (ω)]
E [g (ω)U1 (c (ω) , y (ω) ;ω)]E [y (ω)]
+ 1.
Under the functional for (11), we have U1 = 1 and e (ω) = e for all ω. We then easily
obtain equation (14).
Intuitive derivation of equation (14). Consider a small reform of the tax rate
τ ∗ by δτ , along with an adjustment in the rebate δR in order to ensure that the
government budget remains balanced. First note that this reform (δτ, δR) induces a
behavioral response of every agent: by definition of the elasticity of labor supply, the
pre-tax income of type ω changes by δy (ω) = − y(ω)
1−τ∗ e (ω) δτ . Thus, the universal
lump-sum rebate must be adjusted by
δR = E[y (ω)] δτ + τ ∗ E[δy (ω)] =
{
1 − τ
∗
1− τ ∗ E
[y (ω)
Ey
e (ω)
] }
E[y (ω)] δτ.
The first term in this expression is the statutory change in revenue due to the tax
change δτ , i.e., the effect of the reform ignoring agents' responses to the policy. The
second term accounts for these behavioral (substitution) effects: the actual rise in tax
revenue due to a tax increase δτ > 0 is different from the statutory effect, because
agents respond by adjusting their labor supply. Next, the indirect utility of agent ω
changes, in response to the tax reform (δτ, δR), by
δu (τ, ω) = {−y (ω) δτ + δR}U1 (c (ω) , y (ω) ;ω) .
This follows from the envelope theorem: utility decreases one for one with the change
in the total tax liability (y (ω) δτ − δR) of the agent  in particular, the labor supply
50
responses have only a first-order effect on the agent's welfare. Finally, social welfare
E[g (ω)u (τ, ω)] changes by E[g (ω) δu (τ, ω)]. Imposing that such a reform has a zero
first-order impact on social welfare and rearranging terms easily leads to formula (14).
Proof of Proposition 2 and equations (19, 20). Suppose first that µ = 0. In
this case, party 1 chooses τ 1 to maximize
B1
(
τ 1, τ 2
)
= E
[
q¯(ω)B
(
∆u
(
τ 1, τ 2, ω
) | ω)]
subject to the budget balance constraint
R1 = τ 1E
[
y1 (ω)
]
,
where, as usual, we let
∆u
(
τ 1, τ 2, ω
)
= U
((
1− τ 1) y1 (ω) +R1, y1 (ω) ;ω)− U ((1− τ 2) y2 (ω) +R2, y2 (ω) ;ω) .
By the envelope theorem, we have
∂∆u (τ 1, τ 2, ω)
∂τ 1
= −y1 (ω) + E [y1 (ω)]+ τ 1E [∂y1 (ω)
∂τ 1
]
.
The first order condition to party 1's problem is then given by
0 =
∂B1 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
= E
[
q¯(ω)b
(
∆u
(
τ 1, τ 2, ω
) | ω) ∂∆u (τ 1, τ 2, ω)
∂τ 1
]
.
Noting that the labor supply elasticity is given by − 1−τ1
y1(ω)
∂y1(ω)
∂τ1
= e and rearranging
terms yields
τ 1
E
[
y1(ω)e
1−τ1
]
E [y1 (ω)]
= − E [q¯(ω)b (∆u (·) | ω) y
1 (ω)]
E [q¯(ω)b (∆u (·) | ω)]E [y1 (ω)] + 1.
This in turn leads to formula (19). Since the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
political game is symmetric, we moreover have ∆u (τ 1, τ 2, ω) = 0 for all ω. This leads
to formula (16).
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Suppose next that µ→∞. In this case, party 1's objective is
ψ1
(
τ 1, τ 2
)
=
W 1 (τ 1, τ 2)
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
=
E
[´
(∆u (·)− ε) I{ε≤∆u(·)}b(ε | ω)dε
]
E
[´
(ε−∆u (·)) I{ε≥∆u(·)}b(ε | ω)dε
] .
We have
∂W 1 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
=
∂
∂τ 1
E
[
(∆u (·))B (∆u (·) | ω)−
ˆ ∆u(·)
−∞
εb(ε | ω)dε
]
= E
[
B (∆u (·) | ω) ∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 1
]
and
∂W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
=
∂
∂τ 1
E
[ˆ ∞
∆u(·)
εb(ε | ω)dε− (∆u (·)) (1−B (∆u (·) | ω))
]
= −E
[
(1−B (∆u (·) | ω)) ∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 1
]
.
Next, we have
∂
∂τ 1
{
W 1 (τ 1, τ 2)
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
}
=
1
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
{
∂W 1 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
− W
1 (τ 1, τ 2)
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
}
=
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
×
E
[{
1
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
B (∆u | ω) + ψ
1 (τ 1, τ 2)
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
(1−B (∆u | ω))
}
∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 1
]
.
Following the same steps as in the case µ = 0 shows that the best response of party 1
is given by equation (20). In the symmetric equilibrium, we have τ 1 = τ 2 and hence
∆u (·) = 0 and
W 1 (τ 1, τ 2)
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
=
E
[´ 0
−∞ (−ε) b(ε | ω)dε
]
E
[´∞
0
εb(ε | ω)dε] =: ψ1∗.
This in turn leads to formula (17).
Corollary 3 (Strategic complementarities). In the affine tax policy space, sup-
pose that turnout is exogenous (µ = 0) and that B (· | ω) is uniform for all ω. Then the
two parties' policies are strategically neutral (neither substitutes nor complements).
Suppose next that turnout is endogenous (µ→∞) and that the status quo is the SPE.
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In response to a budget-neutral increase in party 2's tax rate, party 1's best response
is to increase its tax rate (i.e., the policies are strategic complements) if and only if
ψ1∗ < 1, that is, iff the intensity of political preferences among party 1's supporters is
smaller than among party 2's supporters.
Proof of Corollary 3. Suppose first that turnout is exogenous, i.e., µ = 0. Using
the budget balance requirement R1 = τ 1E [y1 (ω)], we get
∂B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
= −E [q¯ (ω) b (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)Y 1 (ω)]
where we let
Y j (ω) := yj (ω)− Eyj + τ
j
1− τ j eE
[
yj (ω)
]
.
In response to a deviation by party 2, ∂B
1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ1
changes by:
∂
∂τ 2
{
∂B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
}
= E
[
q¯ (ω) b′
(
u
(
τ 1, ω
)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)Y 1 (ω) ∂u (τ 2, ω)
∂τ 2
]
= −E [q¯ (ω) b′ (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)Y 1 (ω)Y 2 (ω)] .
If B is uniform, we have b′ (·) = 0, and hence
∂
∂τ 2
{
∂B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
}
= 0.
Therefore party 1 does not have an incentive to raise or lower its tax rate, as this
would have no effect on its base B1(τ 1, τ 2). Therefore, the policies of parties 1 and 2
are strategically neutral.
Now suppose that turnout is endogenous with µ→∞. We have
∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
= −E [γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)Y 1 (ω)]
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where
γ1
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2) = 1
1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
B
(
u
(
τ 1, ω
)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)
+
ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
[
1−B (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)] .
In response to a deviation by party 2, ∂ψ
1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ1
changes by:
∂
∂τ 2
{
∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
}
= E
[(
ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)− 1) b (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)Y 1 (ω) ∂u (τ 2, ω)
∂τ 2
]
= −E [(ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)− 1) b (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)Y 1 (ω)Y 2 (ω)]
where we used the fact that ∂ψ
1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ1
= 0 if the status quo is the SPE. Since the SPE
is symmetric, we have τ 1 = τ 2 and y1 (ω) = y2 (ω) for all ω, so that
∂
∂τ 2
{
∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 1
}
=
(
1− ψ1∗
)
E
[
b (0 | ω) (Y 1 (ω))2] .
This expression is strictly positive if and only if ψ1∗ < 1. In this case, if party 2's tax
rate goes up, party 1 has an incentive to increase its own tax rate, as we would then
have ∂ψ
1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ1
> 0. Thus the two parties' policies are complements. Conversely, they
are substitutes if ψ1∗ > 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using Lemmas 1 and 2 and the first order conditions of the
optimization problems in (26), we can write
σ1∗(p1, p2) =
W 1(p1, p2)
κB1(p1, p2)
Rσ(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
ρ
(
Rσ(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
)
(39)
with
Rσ(p1, p2) =
W 1(p1, p2)/B1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)/B2(p1, p2)
. (40)
Substituting (40) into (39) yields equation (21).
Proof of Corollary 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, and Conditions (i)-
(iv) in Section 3.3 are satisfied. Suppose moreover that µ→∞.
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Party 1's probability of winning. Consider first an increase in party 2's tax
rate on its probability of winning. We saw that
∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
=
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
W 2 (τ 1, τ 2)
E
[
γ1
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2) ∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 1
]
where
∂∆u (τ 1, τ 2, ω)
∂τ 2
= −
{(
1− τ
2
1− τ 2 e
)
E
[
y2(ω)
]− y2(ω)}
This deviation raises party 2's probability of winning the election if ∂ψ
1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ2
< 0,
which holds if:
τ 2
1− τ 2 < −
1
e
Cov
(
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)] ;
y2(ω)
E[y2(ω)]
)
.
This inequality holds for τ 2 sufficiently small since the covariance is bounded, and, by
assumption (ii), negative. Alternatively, suppose that τ 2 < τ ∗2 (τ 1), where τ ∗2 (τ 1)
denotes party 2's best response to party 1's platform τ 1. Since the second-order
conditions are satisfied in equilibrium, there exists  > 0 such that the function
τ 2 7→ ∂ψ1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ2
is increasing, and hence negative, on [τ ∗2 (τ 1) − , τ ∗2 (τ 1)). This im-
plies that a slight increase in party 2's tax rate strictly raises its probability of winning
(i.e., lowers ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)).
Party 2's vote share. Next, consider the impact of the deviation on party 2's
vote share. The total number of votes for party j is equal to
V˜ j(p1, p2) = σj∗(p1, p2)B˜j
(
p1, p2
)
.
Hence party 2's expected vote share is equal to
S2 := E˜
[
σ2∗B˜2
σ1∗B˜1 + σ2∗B˜2
]
= E˜
[(
1 +
σ1∗
σ2∗
η1B1
η2B2
)−1]
= E˜
[(
1 +
W 1
W 2
η1
η2
)−1]
=
ˆ
1
1 + ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2) 1
x
ρ (x) dx.
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The derivative of party 2's vote share with respect to τ 2 is given by
∂S2
∂τ 2
= −
(ˆ
x
[ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2) + x]2
ρ (x) dx
)
∂ψ1 (τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
Therefore, since the deviation raises party 2's probability of winning, so that ∂ψ
1(τ1,τ2)
∂τ2
<
0, it also increases its expected vote share, ∂S
2
∂τ2
> 0.
Overall turnout. Next, expected overall turnout is equal to
Σ := E˜
[
σ1∗(τ 1, τ 2)B˜1(τ 1, τ 2) + σ2∗(τ 1, τ 2)B˜2(τ 1, τ 2)
B˜1(τ 1, τ 2) + B˜2(τ 1, τ 2)
]
=
σ1∗(τ 1, τ 2)B1(τ 1, τ 2) + σ2∗(τ 1, τ 2)B2(τ 1, τ 2)
E [q¯(ω)]
=
σ1∗(τ 1, τ 2)B1(τ 1, τ 2)
E [q¯(ω)]
(
1 +
W 2(τ 1, τ 2)
W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
)
=
W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
κE [q¯(ω)]
(
1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
)
ρ(ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)),
where the last equality follows from (21). We now show that ∂Σ/∂τ 2 < 0, i.e.,
overall turnout decreases in response to party 2's deviation. Since all the terms
in the expression for Σ are positive, the result follows if both ρ(ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)) and
W 1(τ 1, τ 2) (1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)) are decreasing in τ 2.
First, Assumption 3 allows us to compute the distribution of η2/η1 as follows. The
joint distribution of (η1, η2) has the following density:
pη1,η2
(
x1, x2
)
=
1
(η¯ − η)2 I{(x1,x2)∈[η,η¯]×[η,η¯]},
where η := 1− δ and η¯ := 1 + δ. The random variable η1/η2 is non-zero on [η/η¯, η¯/η]
and its density is given, for any ψ ∈ [η/η¯, η¯/η], by
ρ (ψ) =
ˆ η¯
η
x1pη1,η2
(
x1, ψx1
)
dx1 =
1
(η¯ − η)2
ˆ
x1I{x1∈[η,η¯]}I{x1∈[η/ψ,η¯/ψ]}dx1.
Note that if ψ < 1, we have η/ψ > η and η¯/ψ > η¯, so that [η/ψ, η¯/ψ]∩[η, η¯] = [η/ψ, η¯].
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Conversely, if ψ > 1, we have [η/ψ, η¯/ψ] ∩ [η, η¯] = [η, η¯/ψ]. Therefore we have
ρ (ψ) =
1
(η¯ − η)2

´ η¯
η/ψ
x1dx1 if ψ < 1,´ η¯/ψ
η
x1dx1 if ψ > 1.
We easily obtain that, for any ψ < 1,
ρ (ψ) =
η¯1 − η1/ψ2
2(η¯ − η)2 ,
which is increasing in ψ. Moreover, letting P denote the cdf of η2/η1 and summing
over [η/η¯, 1] implies
P (1) = 1/2.
Now recall that party 1's probability of winning decreases in response to party 2's
deviation, i.e., ∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)/∂τ 2 < 0. Since party 2 is the front runner by assumption
(iv), party 1's probability of winning is given by p¯i1 = P (ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)) < 1/2, and
therefore we have ψ1(τ 1, τ 2) < 1. As a result, ρ (·) is locally increasing around the
status quo, and we have ∂ρ(ψ1(τ 1, τ 2))/∂τ 2 < 0 in response to party 2's deviation.
Next, we show that the term W 1(τ 1, τ 2) (1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)) is decreasing. We have
∂ (W 1(τ 1, τ 2) (1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)))
∂τ 2
=
(
1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
) ∂W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
+W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
{
1
W 2(τ 1, τ 2)
∂W 1
∂τ 2
− W
1(τ 1, τ 2)
[W 2(τ 1, τ 2)]2
∂W 2
∂τ 2
}
=
(
1 + 2ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
) ∂W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
− (ψ1(τ 1, τ 2))2 ∂W 2(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
and recall that
∂W 1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
= E
[
B
(
u
(
τ 1, ω
)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω) ∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 2
]
∂W 2(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
= −E
[(
1−B (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)) ∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 2
]
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where
∂ (∆u (·))
∂τ 2
= y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ
2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
]
:= Y 2 (ω) .
Now note that overall turnout decreases as soon as
∂ (W 1(τ 1, τ 2) (1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)))
∂τ 2
< 0
which requires that
E
[
γ˜ (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ˜]
(
y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ
2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< 0
or equivalently
τ 2
1− τ 2 < −
1
e
Cov
(
γ˜ (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E[γ˜]
,
y2 (ω)
Ey2
)
,
where
γ˜
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2) = (2 + 1
ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
)
1
ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
B
(
u
(
τ 1, ω
)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)
+
(
1−B (u (τ 1, ω)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)) .
But recall that party 2's probability of winning increases when τ 2 increases. We saw
above that this implies
E
[
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ1]
(
y2 (ω)− E [y2 (ω)]+ τ 2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< 0
or equivalently
τ 2
1− τ 2 < −
1
e
Cov
(
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ1]
,
y2 (ω)
Ey2
)
,
where
γ1
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2) = 1
1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
B (∆u (·) | ω) + ψ
1(τ 1, τ 2)
1 + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
(1−B (∆u (·) | ω)) .
Since the previous expectation is negative, the tax rate τ 2 is not Pareto dominated,
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i.e., τ
2
1−τ2 < 1/e. Hence the term Y
2 (ω) (defined above) is negative for low val-
ues of ω and monotonically increasing in ω. Now, notice that γ˜ (ω | τ 1, τ 2) /E[γ˜]
puts relatively more weight on low incomes (hence on negative values of Y (ω)), and
less on high incomes, than γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2) /E[γ1]. Indeed, γ˜ (ω | τ 1, τ 2) puts a larger
(resp., smaller) relative weight than γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2) on B (∆u (·) | ω) (respectively, on
(1−B (∆u (·) | ω))), which is decreasing (resp., increasing) in ω and has therefore a
negative (resp., positive) covariance with incomes y2 (ω). As a result, we have
E
[
γ˜ (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ˜]
(
y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ
2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< E
[
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ1]
(
y2 (ω)− E [y2 (ω)]+ τ 2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< 0.
Therefore, overall turnout Σ decreases in response to party 2's deviation.
Relative turnout rates. Finally, we show that the relative turnout σ1∗/σ2∗ also
decreases. We have
σ1∗(τ 1, τ 2)
σ2∗(τ 1, τ 2)
= ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
E [q¯ (ω)]−B1(τ 1, τ 2)
B1(τ 1, τ 2)
.
In response to party 2's deviation, we have
∂B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
= −E
[
q¯ (ω) b
(
u
(
τ 1, ω
)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω) ∂u (τ 2, ω)
∂τ 2
]
= E
[
q¯ (ω) b
(
u
(
τ 1, ω
)− u (τ 2, ω) | ω)(y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ 2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
.
We thus have
∂
∂τ 2
σ1∗(τ 1, τ 2)
σ2∗(τ 1, τ 2)
=
Eq¯ −B1(τ 1, τ 2)
B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
−
[
ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
B1(τ 1, τ 2)
+ ψ1(τ 1, τ 2)
Eq¯ −B1(τ 1, τ 2)
(B1(τ 1, τ 2))2
]
∂B1(τ 1, τ 2)
∂τ 2
= E
[
˜˜γ
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2)(y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ 2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
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where
˜˜γ
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2) = B (∆u (·) | ω) + ψ1(τ 1, τ 2) (1−B (∆u (·) | ω))
−W
1 (τ 1, τ 2)
B1(τ 1, τ 2)
(
1 +
B1(τ 1, τ 2)
B2(τ 1, τ 2)
)
b (∆u (·) | ω) .
Hence ∂
∂τ2
σ1∗(τ1,τ2)
σ2∗(τ1,τ2) < 0 if
E
[ ˜˜γ (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E[˜˜γ]
(
y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ
2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< 0.
Now, Assumption 2 implies that b (∆u (·) | ω) is a constant, so that
˜˜γ
(
ω | τ 1, τ 2) = γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)− A,
where 1 > 0 is a constant. Throughout we assume that the weights ˜˜γ (τ 1, τ 2 | ω) are
positive, which is ensured by assuming that for all ω we have b (ω) ≤ β, for some
β > 0 small enough, as we also assume in Lemma 4. Moreover, note that the weights
γ1 (τ 1, τ 2 | ω) are decreasing in ω by Condition (i) in Corollary 2 and the fact, proved
above, that ψ1(τ 1, τ 2) < 1. As a consequence, for any ω′ > ω, we have
˜˜γ (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
˜˜γ (ω′ | τ 1, τ 2) =
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)− A
γ1 (ω′ | τ 1, τ 2)− A >
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
γ1 (ω′ | τ 1, τ 2)
where the inequality follows from γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2) > γ1 (ω′ | τ 1, τ 2). Therefore, the
relative weight that ˜˜γ (ω | τ 1, τ 2) puts on low (resp., high) incomes is thus larger
(resp., smaller) than the relative weight that γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2) puts on them. Since
Y 2 (ω) is negative for low values of ω and monotonically increasing in ω, we have
E
[ ˜˜γ (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E[˜˜γ]
(
y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ
2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< E
[
γ1 (ω | τ 1, τ 2)
E [γ1]
(
y2 (ω)− Ey2 + τ
2
1− τ 2 eE
[
y2 (ω)
])]
< 0
where the second inequality follows from the fact that the deviation raises party 2's
probability of winning. This concludes the proof that the relative turnout decreases
in τ 2.
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D Proofs of Section 4
In this section, we provide technical elements regarding the environment of Section 4
and prove Proposition 3. We postpone the analysis of equilibrium existence to Section
E below.
D.1 Preliminaries: On the Pareto-frontier
In this preliminary section we set up the mechanism design approach to obtain a
characterization of admissible tax systems. Suppose that the preferences of a type ω
individual over (c, y)-pairs are represented by a utility function c−v(y, ω), with v1 > 0,
v11 > 0, v2 < 0 and v12 < 0. An admissible tax system T can be represented by a
non-decreasing earnings function y : Ω→ R+. Specifically, by the taxation principle,
see e.g. Hammond (1979) or Guesnerie (1995), an allocation (c, y) consisting of a
consumption schedule c : Ω → R+ and an earnings schedule y : Ω → R+ can be
induced by an income tax if and only if it satisfies the resource constraint,
E[y(ω)] ≥ E[c(ω)] (41)
and incentive compatibility constraints: For all ω and ω′,
u(ω) ≥ c(ω′)− v(y(ω′), ω) . (42)
where
u(ω) := c(ω)− v(y(ω), ω) . (43)
gives the utility that a type ω individual realizes under allocation (c, y).
It is also well known how to obtain a characterization of incentive compatible
allocations in models with quasilinear preferences, see e.g. Myerson (1981). The
utility realized by any one type-ω individual under earnings function y can be written
as a sum of two terms, the minimal level of utility that is realized by the poorest
type and the extra utility realized by higher types. More formally, an application of
the envelope theorem makes it possible to show that incentive compatibility holds if
and only if two conditions are satisfied. First, for all ω,
u(ω) = u−
ˆ ω
ω
v2(y(z), z) dz , (44)
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where u := u(ω) is a shorthand for the lowest type's utility and − ´ ω
ω
v2(y(z), z) dz
is the information rent realized by a higher type ω > ω in the presence of incentive
compatibility constraints. This terminology reflects that private information on types
is the impediment to first-best redistribution. Second, y is a non-decreasing function,
i.e., individuals with higher productive abilities must not earn less than individuals
with lower productive abilities.
We can use these insights to derive a representation of preferences over tax polices
in a reduced form that only depends on the income function y and no longer involves
a reference to the consumption function c. This will enable us to represent a party's
problem of choosing a tax policy as an optimization problems that no longer involve
resource and incentive constraints. Suppose that (c, y) is incentive compatible, then
using (43), (44) and an integration by parts we obtain
E[c(ω)] = u+ E
[
v(y(ω), ω)− 1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v2(y(ω), ω)
]
.
Plugging this expression into the public sector budget constraint E[y(ω)]−E[c(ω)] = 0
yields an expression for u; it is equal to the virtual surplus that is associated with an
earnings function y:
u := sv(y) := E
[
y(ω)− v(y(ω), ω) + 1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v2(y(ω), ω)
]
. (45)
The virtual surplus is a surplus measure that takes account of the information rents
that tax-payers realize and which reduces what is available for the lowest type. To
arrive at the virtual surplus, the surplus of aggregate output over costs of effort
sv(y) := E [y(ω)− v(y(ω), ω)]
is reduced by the aggregate information rent
−E
[ˆ ω
ω
v2(y(z), z) dz
]
= −E
[
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v2(y(ω), ω)
]
,
where the equality follows from an integration by parts. Thus,
u = sv(y) = E
[
y(ω)− v(y(ω), ω) + 1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v2(y(ω), ω)
]
. (46)
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Indirect utility induced by an incentive compatible allocation can now be written as
a sum of virtual surplus and information rents
u(ω) := sv(y)−
ˆ ω
ω
v2(y(z), z) dz . (47)
With this characterization, the utility realized by a type ω individual depends on
the whole earnings schedule y : Ω→ R+ but no longer on the consumption schedule
c : Ω→ R+. When we study political competition over income tax schedules, we will
denote party 1's proposal by y1 : Ω→ R+ and party 2's proposal by y2 : Ω→ R+ and
we denote by u1(ω) and u2(ω) the associated utility levels for a type ω individual.
To summarize, for the application of non-linear income taxation, the policy space
is the set of all non-decreasing earnings functions. Any such function generates a
payoff profile that is characterized by equations (44) and (46). We are particularly
interested in the marginal tax rates that are associated with the tax systems that
the parties propose. To get from an incentive compatible allocation to the associated
tax schedule T we use the first order condition of the utility-maximization problem
that individuals face in the presence of this tax system. If tax system T induces an
incentive compatible allocation (c, y), then
1− T ′(y(ω)) = v1(y(ω), ω) .
Hence, 1 − v1(y(ω), ω) is interpreted as the marginal tax rates that type ω agents
face.
For the government problem, we consider a class of additive social welfare func-
tions. Members of this class differ with respect to the specification of welfare weights
{B(ω)}ω∈Ω. The social welfare functions take the form
SW(y) = E [B(ω) u(ω)] .
It is wlog to adopt the normalization E[B(ω)] = 1. Using equations (44) and (46)
and another integration by parts we can rewrite social welfare as
SW(y) = E
[
y(ω)− v(y(ω), ω) + 1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(1− GB(ω)) v2(y(ω), ω)
]
,
where GB(ω) := E[B(z) | z ≥ ω]. The problem of welfare-maximization is to choose
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the earnings function y that maximizes this welfare objective over the set of non-
decreasing functions. The relaxed problem of welfare-maximization is to choose the
earnings function that maximizes this welfare objective over the set of all functions.
Assumption 4. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. For any weighting function B : Ω → R+ with E[B(ω)] = 1, the above problem
of welfare-maximization has a unique solution. Let yB be the earnings function
that solves this problem.
2. For any weighting function B : Ω→ R+ with E[B(ω)] = 1, the relaxed problem
of welfare-maximization has a unique solution. Let yrB be the earnings function
that solves the this relaxed problem.
3. The function yrB satisfies Diamond's formula; i.e. for all ω,
1− v1(y(ω), ω) = −1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(1− GB(ω)) v21(y(ω), ω) .
Moreover, yrB is the only function that satisfies Diamond's formula.
4. For all ω so that the monotonicity constraint on yB is not binding, y
r
B(ω) =
yB(ω).
Assumption 4 is routinely invoked in models of optimal income taxation. The as-
sumption can be justified. With an appropriate choice of the primitives, the solutions
to the relaxed and the full problem of welfare-maximization can be shown to satisfy
properties 1. 4. We simply impose Assumption 4 as a shortcut.
D.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We start by analyzing the problem to choose y1 so as to maximize W 1(y1, y2).24The
following notation will prove helpful. Remember that W 1(y1, y2) = E[G1W (u1(ω) −
24We thereby provide a characterization of the solution to a relaxed problem, as opposed to the
full problem to maximize W 1(y1, y2) subject to the constraint that y1 is a non-decreasing function.
Obviously, if the solution to the relaxed problem is non-decreasing then it is also a solution to the
full problem. Otherwise, the solution of the full problem will give rise to bunching. While it is well
known how the analysis would have to be modified if bunching is an issue, see e.g. Hellwig (2007)
or Brett and Weymark (2017), the trade-offs that shape best responses are, however, more easily
exposed when focusing on the relaxed problem.
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u2(ω) | ω)]. We denote the derivative of the function G1W (· | ω) by
g1W (· | ω) := B
(
u1(ω)− u2(ω) | ω)
(this expression has been derived in Section C) and write
g¯1W (ω | y1, y2) := E[B(u1(ω′)− u2(ω′) | ω′) | ω′ ≥ ω]
=
´ ω¯
ω
B(u1(ω′)− u2(ω′) | ω′) f(ω′)
1−F (ω)dω
′
for the average value of B(u1(ω′) − u2(ω′) | ω′) among individuals with a type ω′
above some cutoff ω. To interpret these expressions, suppose that party 1 offers
slightly more utility to type ω′ individuals. Then B(u1(ω′) − u2(ω′) | ω′) measures
the extra gain that type ω′-supporters of party 1 realize in the event that party 1
wins rather party 2. Therefore, g¯1W (ω | T 1, T 2) is the gain that party 1 can generate
by offering all agents with types above ω slightly more utility. The gain that party 1
can generate by slightly raising everybody's utility is given by g¯1W (ω | y1, y2) and the
ratio
G1W (ω | y1, y2) :=
g¯1W (ω | y1, y2)
g¯1W (ω | y1, y2)
relates the gain from making everybody with a type above ω better off to the gain
from making everybody better off.
Lemma 9. Given y2, the solution to maxy1 W
1(y1, y2) is such that, for all ω,
T 1
′
(y1(ω))
1− T 1′(y1(ω)) = −
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(
1− G1W (ω | y1, y2)
) v21(y1(ω), ω))
v1(y1(ω), ω)
. (48)
Proof of Lemma 9. We begin by stating party 1's best response problem in a way
that enables an analysis using a Gateaux differential. Let y1 = y1∗ +  h1, be a
perturbed version of party 1's best response y1∗, in which  is a scalar and h1 : Ω→ R
is a function. If y1∗ is a best response, then, for any perturbation (, h1),
E
[
G1W
(
sv(y
1∗)− ´ ω
ω
v2(y
1∗(z), z) dz − u2(ω) | ω
)]
≥ E
[
G1W
(
sv(y
1∗ +  h1)− ´ ω
ω
v2(y
1∗(z) +  h1(z), z) dz − u2(ω) | ω
)]
.
(49)
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Equivalently, for any function h1,  = 0 must be a maximizer of the auxiliary function
A( | y1∗, y2) = E
[
G1W
(
sv(y
1∗ +  h1)−
ˆ ω
ω
v2(y
1∗(z) +  h1(z), z) dz − u2(ω) | ω
)]
.
In the following, we will characterize y1∗ by analyzing the implications of the require-
ment that the derivative of this expression with respect to , evaluated at  = 0, is
equal to zero, i.e.,
Ah1(y
1∗, y2) = 0 , (50)
for all functions h1. Formally, Ah1(y
1∗, y2) is the Gateaux differential of
E
[
G1W
(
sv(y
1)−
ˆ ω
ω
v2(y
1(z), z) dz − u2(ω) | ω
)]
in direction h1 evaluated at y1 = y1∗.
We note that
Ah1(y
1∗, y2) = E
[
g1W (ω | y1∗, y2)
(
sv,τ1(y
1∗)−
ˆ ω
ω
h1(z) v21(y
1∗(z), z) dz
)]
, (51)
where
g1W (ω | y1∗, y2) := b
(
sv(y
1∗)−
ˆ ω
ω
v2(y
1∗(z), z) dz − u2(ω) | ω
)
and
sv,h1(y
1∗) = E
[
h1(ω)
(
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) v21(y1∗(ω), ω)
)]
is the Gateaux differential of the virtual surplus sv(y
1) in direction h1 evaluated at
y1 = y1∗.
Equation (51) can now be rewritten as
Ah1(y
1∗, y2) = g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2)E
[
h1(ω)
(
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) v21(y1∗(ω), ω)
)]
−E
[
g1W (ω | y1∗, y2)
´ ω
ω
h1(z) v21(y
1∗(z), z) dz
]
(52)
where, for any ω ∈ Ω, g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2) := E[g1W (ω′ | y1∗, y2) | ω′ ≥ ω]. Moreover, an
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integration by parts shows that
E
[
g1W (ω | y1∗, y2)
ˆ ω
ω
h1(z) v21(y
1∗(z), z) dz
]
(53)
= E
[
h1(ω) g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2)
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v21(y
1∗(ω), ω)
]
so that condition (50) can equivalently be written as the requirement that, for all
functions h1,
E
[
h1(ω)
(
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + (1− G1W (ω | y1∗, y2))
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v21(y
1∗(ω), ω)
)]
= 0
(54)
where G1W (ω | y1∗, y2) = g¯
1
W (ω|y1∗,y2)
g¯1W (ω|y1∗,y2)
. Condition (54) can hold only if, for all ω,
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + (1− G1W (ω | y1∗, y2))
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v21(y
1∗(ω), ω) = 0 , (55)
or, equivalently, if
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω)
v1(y1∗(ω), ω)
= −(1− G1W (ω | y1∗, y2))
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v21(y
1∗(ω), ω)
v1(y1∗(ω), ω)
. (56)
Using T 1
′
(y1∗(ω)) = 1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) we can rewrite this equation as
T 1
′
(y1∗(ω))
1− T 1′(y1∗(ω)) = −(1− G
1
W (ω | y1∗, y2))
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
v21(y
1∗(ω), ω)
v1(y1∗(ω), ω)
, (57)
which is what had to be shown.
The optimality condition in (48) could also be derived on the assumption that
party 1 seeks to maximize sv(y
1)−E [G(ω) v2(y1(ω), ω)] for G(ω) = G1W (ω | y1, y2), i.e.,
a utilitarian welfare objective with particular weights on the rents that are realized by
types ω > ω. In this maximization problem the weighting function G is exogenously
fixed, albeit at the level that is induced by y2 and party 1's best response. Thus, as
discussed in the main body, equation (48) is akin to Diamond (1998)'s formula.
The following Lemma describes the solution to another auxiliary problem for
party 1, namely the problem to choose policy with the objective to minimize what is
at stake for the supporters of party 2. We omit a proof and discussion of the Lemma
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as it would involve only a straightforward adjustment of those of Lemma 9. The
Lemma involves a weighting function G2W for information rents that is derived from
W 2(y1, y2) = E[G2W (u2(ω) − u1(ω) | ω)] along the same lines as G1W is derived from
W 1(y1, y2), where we now have:
g2W (· | ω) ≡ 1−B
(
u1(ω)− u2(ω) | ω) .
Lemma 10. Given y2, the solution to miny1 W
2(y1, y2) is such that, for all ω,
T 1
′
(y1(ω))
1− T 1′(y1(ω)) = −
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(
1− G2W (ω | y1, y2)
) v21(y1(ω), ω))
v1(y1(ω), ω)
. (58)
Main result. We finally turn to party 1's best response problem of interest and
then provide an equilibrium characterization. We proceed by introducing notation
for a weighted average of G1W and G2W . Let
γ1(ω | y1, y2) := 1
1 + ψ1(y1, y2)
g1W (u
1(ω)− u2(ω) | y1, y2)
+
ψ1(y1, y2)
1 + ψ1(y1, y2)
g2W (u
1(ω)− u2(ω) | y1, y2)
=
1
1 + ψ1(y1, y2)
B
(
u1(ω)− u2(ω) | ω)
+
ψ1(y1, y2)
1 + ψ1(y1, y2)
(
1−B (u1(ω)− u2(ω) | ω))
and denote by
γ¯1(ω | y1, y2) := E[γ1(ω′ | y1, y2) | ω′ ≥ ω]
and
G1SP (ω | y1, y2) :=
γ¯1(ω | y1, y2)
γ¯1(ω | y1, y2) .
When both parties propose the same policies y1 = y2 =: y, we have u1(ω)−u2(ω) = 0
and we can suppress the dependence of these expressions on y1 and y2 and write
γ¯(ω) := γ¯1(ω | y, y), and GSP (ω) := γ¯(ω)
γ¯(ω)
.
For convenience, we restate our main result, Proposition 3, using the notations of this
section.
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Proposition (Political equilibrium nonlinear tax policy). Given y2, if y1 is a
maximizer of ψ1(y1, y2) then, for all ω,
T 1
′
(y1(ω))
1− T 1′(y1(ω)) = −
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(
1− G1SP (ω | y1, y2)
) v21(y1(ω), ω))
v1(y1(ω), ω)
. (59)
If (y1, y2) is a saddle point of ψ1, then y1 = y2, where y1 is such that, for all ω,
T 1
′
(y1(ω))
1− T 1′(y1(ω)) = −
1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(1− GSP (ω)) v21(y
1(ω), ω))
v1(y1(ω), ω)
. (60)
Proof of Proposition 3. Let y2 be an arbitrary, but given function, possibly equal
to y2∗. Given y2 we look at the problem to choose y1 with the objective to maximize
ψ1(y1, y2) =
W 1(y1, y2)
W 2(y1, y2)
.
Suppose that y1∗ is a solution to that problem. Then, it must also be that case that
 = 0 solves the problem to choose a scalar  with the objective to maximize
ψ1(y1∗ +  h1, y2) =
W 1(y1∗ +  h1, y2)
W 2(y1∗ +  h1, y2)
.
for any given but arbitrary function h1. That is, we can characterize y1∗ be the
requirement that
∂ψ1(y1∗ +  h1, y2)
∂
∣∣∣∣
=0
= 0 ,
or, equivalently, that
W 1h1(y
1∗, y2) W 2(y1∗, y2)−W 1(y1∗, y2) W 2h1(y1∗, y2) = 0 ,
where W jh1 is the Gateaux differential of W
1 is the direction h1.
Best responses. The following equations provide a characterization of W 1h1 and
W 2h1 and of the analogous expressions W
1
h2 and W
2
h2 that are relevant for party 2's
best response problem. We omit a proof as it would require only an easy adaptation
of the arguments in the proof of Lemma 9. The Gateaux differential of W 1 in the
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direction h1 evaluated at (y1∗, y2) equals
W 1h1(y
1∗, y2) = g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2)×
E
[
h1(ω)
{
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G1W (ω | y1∗, y2)) v21(y1∗(ω), ω)
}]
.
(61)
The Gateaux differential of W 2 in the direction h1 evaluated at (y1∗, y2) equals
W 2h1(y
1∗, y2) = −g¯2W (ω | y1∗, y2)×
E
[
h1(ω)
{
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G2W (ω | y1∗, y2)) v21(y1∗(ω), ω)
}]
.
(62)
The Gateaux differential of W 1 in the direction h2 evaluated at (y1, y2∗) equals
W 1h2(y
1, y2∗) = −g¯1W (ω | y1, y2∗)×
E
[
h2(ω)
{
1− v1(y2∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G1W (ω | y1, y2∗)) v21(y2∗(ω), ω)
}]
.
(63)
The Gateaux differential of W 2 in the direction h2 evaluated at (y1, y2∗) equals
W 2h2(y
1, y2∗) = g¯2W (ω | y1, y2∗)×
E
[
h2(ω)
{
1− v1(y2∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G2W (ω | y1, y2∗)) v21(y2∗(ω), ω)
}]
.
(64)
Now, the Gateaux differential of ψ1 = W 1/W 2 in the direction h1 evaluated at (y1∗, y2)
has the same sign as
1
γ¯1(ω | y1∗, y2)
1
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
1
W 2(y1∗, y2)
×{
W 1h1(y
1∗, y2) W 2(y1∗, y2)−W 1(y1∗, y2) W 2h1(y1∗, y2)
}
=
1
γ¯1(ω | y1∗, y2)
{
1
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
W 1h1(y
1∗, y2)− ψ
1(y1∗, y2)
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
W 2h1(y
1∗, y2)
}
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Now notice that
1
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2)
(
1− G1W (ω | y1∗, y2)
)
+
ψ1(y1∗, y2)
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
g¯2W (ω | y1∗, y2)
(
1− G2W (ω | y1∗, y2)
)
=
{
1
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2) +
ψ1(y1∗, y2)
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
g¯2W (ω | y1∗, y2)
}
−
{
1
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
g¯1W (ω | y1∗, y2) +
ψ1(y1∗, y2)
1 + ψ1(y1∗, y2)
g¯2W (ω | y1∗, y2)
}
= γ¯1(ω | y1∗, y2) (1− G1SP (ω | y1, y2)) .
Therefore, expressions (61) and (62) imply that the Gateaux differential of ψ1 is given
by
E
[
h1(ω)
{
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G1SP (ω | y1∗, y2)) v21(y1∗(ω), ω)
}]
. (65)
Analogously, the Gateaux differential of ψ1 in the direction h2 evaluated at (y1, y2∗)
has the same sign as
1
γ¯1(ω|y1,y2∗)
1
1+ψ1(y1,y2∗)
1
W 2(y1,y2∗)
{
W 1h2(y
1, y2∗) W 2(y1, y2∗)−W 1(y1, y2∗) W 2h2(y1, y2∗)
}
= −E
[
h2(ω)
{
1− v1(y2∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G1SP (ω | y1, y2∗)) v21(y2∗(ω), ω)
}]
.
(66)
Subgame perfect equilibrium. Now, if y1∗ and y2∗ are mutually best responses,
then it must be the case that the Gateaux differentials
W 1h1(y
1∗, y2∗) W 2(y1∗, y2∗)−W 1(y1∗, y2∗) W 2h1(y1∗, y2∗) = 0 ,
for all functions h1 and
W 1h2(y
1∗, y2∗) W 2(y1∗, y2∗)−W 1(y1∗, y2∗) W 2h2(y1∗, y2∗) = 0 ,
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for all functions h2. The conditions above require that, for all ω,
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G1SP (ω | y1∗, y2∗)) v21(y1∗(ω), ω) = 0 , (67)
and
1− v1(y2∗(ω), ω) + 1−F (ω)f(ω) (1− G1SP (ω | y1∗, y2∗)) v21(y2∗(ω), ω) = 0 . (68)
An inspection of (67) and (68) implies in particular that in any interior subgame
perfect equilibrium, y1∗ = y2∗. To complete the proof of Proposition 3, we note that
rearranging the terms in (67) and using that T ′(y(ω)) = v1(y(ω), ω) yields equation
(60).
E Proof of Lemma 4: Equilibrium existence for non-
linear taxation
Party 1 chooses an earnings function y1 and party 2 chooses an earnings function y2.
The objective of party 1 is to maximize
ψ1(y1, y2) =
W 1(y1, y2)
W 2(y1, y2)
and the objective of party 2 is to minimize this expression. As we clarify below,
focusing on this case µ → ∞ simplifies the exposition and the argument does not
depend on it. For ease of exposition, we ignore the monotonicity constraints on y1
and y2 in what follows. Thus, we characterize the policies that are mutual best
responses in the sense of solving relaxed best response problems.
Saddle point. We have shown above that, under Assumption 4, if an equilibrium
exists, it is symmetric, i.e. such that y1 = y2. Assumption 4 ensures that there is a
unique solution to the first order conditions (67) and (68). We now show that, under
Assumption 2, this hypothetical equilibrium is a local saddle point of the function
ψ1.
Lemma 11. Suppose that the Assumptions of Lemma 4 are satisfied. Then, a pair
of policies that satisfies (60) is a saddle point of the function ψ1.
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Proof of Lemma 11. Suppose that a pair of policies (y1∗, y2∗) satisfies the first
order conditions (74) and (74). We seek to show that (y1∗, y2∗) is a saddle point of
the function
ψ1(y1, y2) =
W 1(y1, y2)
W 2(y1, y2)
.
We now state this saddle point condition in a way that enables an analysis using
functional derivatives. Let y1 = y1∗ + 1 h1, be a perturbed version of y1∗, in which
1 is a scalar and h1 : Ω → R is a function. Analogously, let y2 = y2∗ + 2 h2, be
a perturbed version of y2. The saddle point condition according to which, for all
(y1, y2),
ψ1(y1, y2∗) ≤ ψ1(y1∗, y2∗) ≤ ψ1(y1∗, y2)
can therefore be written as: for any pair of perturbations (1, h1) and (2, h2),
ψ1(y1∗ + 1 h1, y2∗) ≤ ψ1(y1∗, y2∗) ≤ ψ1(y1∗, y∗2 + 2 h2) . (69)
Equivalently, for all functions (h1, h2), the point (1, 2) = (0, 0) must be a saddle-
point of
ψ1(y1∗ + 1 h1, y2∗ + 1 h2) =
W 1(y1∗ + 1 h1, y∗2 + 2 h2)
W 2(y1∗ + 1 h1, y∗2 + 2 h2)
.
Having a saddle point requires that all entries of the Jacobi-matrix
Jψ(y
1∗, y2∗) =
(
ψ11(y
1∗, y2∗)
ψ12(y
1∗, y2∗)
)
are equal to zero and that the Hessian
Hψ(y
1∗, y2∗) =
(
ψ11,1(y
1∗, y2∗) ψ11,2(y
1∗, y2∗)
ψ11,2(y
1∗, y2∗) ψ12,2(y
1∗, y2∗)
)
is indefinite. The policies (y1∗, y2∗) satisfying the first order conditions (74) and (74)
is equivalent to all entries of the Jacobi-matrix being equal to zero. Hence, what
remains to be shown is that Hψ(y
1∗, y2∗) is indefinite. To this end, it suffices to show
that ψ11,1(y
1∗, y2∗) < 0, and ψ12,2(y
1∗, y2∗) > 0. These two inequalities can be shown
to hold provided that
∂
∂1
{
W 11(y
1∗, y2∗) W 2(y1∗, y2∗)−W 1(y1∗, y2∗) W 21(y1∗, y2∗)
}
< 0 ,
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and
∂
∂2
{
W 12(y
1∗, y2∗) W 2(y1∗, y2∗)−W 1(y1∗, y2∗) W 22(y1∗, y2∗)
}
> 0 ,
or, equivalently, if
W 11,1(y
1∗, y2∗) W 2(y1∗, y2∗)−W 1(y1∗, y2∗) W 21,1(y1∗, y2∗) < 0 , (70)
and
W 12,2(y
1∗, y2∗) W 2(y1∗, y2∗)−W 1(y1∗, y2∗) W 22,2(y1∗, y2∗) > 0 . (71)
Now, under Assumption 2,
W 1(y1, y2)
= E
[
B(ω)
(
u1(ω)− u2(ω))+ 1
2
b(ω)
(
u1(ω)− u2(ω))2 + 1
2
(
B(ω)2
b(ω)
)]
and
W 2(y1, y2)
= E
[
(1−B(ω)) (u2(ω)− u1(ω))+ 1
2
b(ω)
(
u2(ω)− u1(ω))2 + 1
2
(
1−B(ω)2
b(ω)
)]
.
It follows from Proposition 3 that y1∗ = y2∗, henceW 1(y1∗, y2∗) > 0 andW 2(y1∗, y2∗) >
0. Sufficient conditions for the validity of (70) and (71) are therefore that
W 11,1(y
1∗, y2∗) < 0 and W 21,1(y
1∗, y2∗) > 0 , (72)
and
W 12,2(y
1∗, y2∗) > 0 and W 22,2(y
1∗, y2∗) < 0 . (73)
We can now use the expressions for W 11 , W
2
1 , W
1
2 and W
2
2 (or, equivalently, the
Gateaux differentials W 1h1 , W
2
h1 , W
1
h2 and W
2
h2) derived above to compute W
1
1,1 ,
W 21,1 , W
1
2,2 and W
2
2,2 . If we evaluate the resulting expressions in the limit case as
b(ω) arbitrarily close to zero for all ω, we can verify that (72) and (73) indeed hold.
For instance, we then find that
W 11,1(y
1∗, y2∗)
= B¯(ω)E
[
h1(ω)2
(
−v11(y∗(ω), ω) + 1− F (ω)
f(ω)
(
1− B¯(ω)
B¯(ω)
)
v211(y
∗(ω), ω)
)]
,
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where B¯(ω) := E [B(ω′) | ω′ ≥ ω]. With B(ω) = 1
2
, for all ω,
1− B¯(ω)
B¯(ω)
= 0 ,
for all ω, so that
W 11,1(y
1∗, y2∗) = B¯(ω)E
[
h1(ω)2 (−v11(y∗(ω), ω))
]
< 0 .
Equilibrium. We now show that the local saddle point characterized in the previous
proof is indeed an equilibrium point. To this end, we need to show that it is a
best response for party 1 to play the hypothetical equilibrium strategy  on the
assumption that party 2 also plays this strategy. The results stated so far only imply
that playing the the hypothetical equilibrium strategy is a local best response for
party 1. What remains to be shown is that this local best response is also the global
best response and that there is no other global best respone. In the following section
we will use the contraction mapping theorem to show that this is indeed the case.
A symmetric argument then implies that it is a best response for party 2 to play
the hypothetical equilibrium strategy provided that party 1 plays accordingly. To
simplify the exposition, suppose moreover that the utility function takes the form
(11).
Proof of Lemma 4. Let yeq be the hypothetical equilibrium strategy and suppose
that y2 = yeq. We have shown above that a best response y1∗ for party 1 satisfies:
1− v1(y1∗(ω), ω)
v1(y1∗(ω), ω)
=
(
1 +
1
e
)
1− F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(
1− G1SP (ω | y1∗, yeq)
)
. (74)
or, equivalently,
ω1+
1
e y1∗(ω)−
1
e − 1 =
(
1 +
1
e
)
1− F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(
1− G1SP (ω | y1∗, yeq)
)
.
For an arbitrary earnings function y define A(y) = {A(ω, y)}ω∈Ω with
A(ω, y) =
(
1 +
(
1 +
1
e
)
1− F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(
1− G1SP (ω | y, yeq)
))−e
ω1+e .
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Armed with this notation, we rewrite the previous equation one more time as
y1∗(ω) = A(ω, y1∗) ,
for all ω. We also know from the previous arguments that this equation is satisfied
for y1 = yeq.
It proves useful to interpret this equation as characterizing a fixed point in a
functional space. Therefore, given an arbitrary earnings function y, first interpret
A(·) as a function of the earnings function y and then define by y∗(A(y)) the earnings
function that satisfies,
y∗(ω,A(y)) = A(ω, y) ,
for all ω. By interpreting y∗ also as a function of y, we can say that a fixed point
of y∗ is an earnings function yfix with the property that y∗(A(yfix)) = yfix. By the
previous arguments, we also know that yeq is such a fixed point.
Now, if yeq is not the best response of party 1, this implies that there must be
another solution yfix 6= yeq to this fixed point equation. In the following we will
rule this possibility out, by showing that, under the conditions of Lemma 4, y∗ is a
contraction mapping and therefore has one and only one fixed point.
Consider a metric space of earnings functions equipped with the supmetric, i.e. for
two earnings functions ya and yb,
d (ya, yb) := sup
ω∈Ω
| ya(ω)− yb(ω) | .
To establish that y∗(·) is a contraction mapping, we need to show that, for any pair
(ya, yb),
d (y∗(A(ya)), y∗(A(yb))) ≤ k d (ya, yb) , (75)
for k ∈ (0, 1).
Remember that the analysis proceeds under the assumption that B(ω) ∈ [1
2
−
α, 1
2
+ α] and b(ω) ≤ β, for all ω. In the following, we show that an appropriate
choice of α and β ensures that, for any ω, | y∗(ω,A(ya)) − y∗(ω,A(yb)) | becomes
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arbitrarily small. Note that
| y∗(ω,A(ya))− y∗(ω,A(yb)) |
= ω1+e |
(
1 + 1−F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(1− G1SP (ω | ya, yeq)) 1e
)−e
−
(
1 + 1−F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(1− G1SP (ω | yb, yeq)) 1e
)−e
| .
Moreover, by continuity,
G1SP (ω | ya, yeq)→ G1SP (ω | yb, yeq)
implies
|
(
1 + 1−F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(1− G1SP (ω | ya, yeq)) 1e
)−e
−
(
1 + 1−F (ω)
f(ω) ω
(1− G1SP (ω | yb, yeq)) 1e
)−e
| → 0 .
Thus, it suffices to show that G1SP (ω | ya, yeq) is arbitrarily close to G1SP (ω | yb, yeq)
for an appropriate choice of α and β.
Let ∆u(ya, y
eq, ω) = u(ya, ω)− u(yeq, ω). Also let
∆u(ya, y
eq) = max
ω∈Ω
∆u(ya, y
eq, ω)
and
∆u(ya, y
eq) = min
ω∈Ω
∆u(ya, y
eq, ω) .
It is wlog to assume that ya is a Pareto-efficient earnings function which implies that
∆u(ya, y
eq) > 0 > ∆u(ya, y
eq) .
Recall that (see Section D)
G1SP (ω | ya, yeq) = λ1(ya, yeq) G1W (ω | ya, yeq) + λ2(ya, yeq)) G2W (ω | ya, yeq) ,(76)
where
G1W (ω | ya, yeq) =
´ ω
ω
B(∆u(ya, y
eq, ω) | ω) dω´ ω
ω
B(∆u(ya, yeq, ω) | ω) dω
=
´ ω
ω
{B(ω) + b(ω)∆u(ya, yeq, ω)}dω´ ω
ω
{B(ω) + b(ω)∆u(ya, yeq, ω)}dω
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and
G2W (ω | ya, yeq) =
´ ω
ω
(1−B(∆u(ya, yeq, ω) | ω)) dω´ ω
ω
(1−B(∆u(ya, yeq, ω) | ω)) dω
=
´ ω
ω
{1−B(ω)− b(ω)∆u(ya, yeq, ω)}dω´ ω
ω
{1−B(ω)− b(ω)∆u(ya, yeq, ω)}dω
and
λ1(y1, y2) :=
1
1 + ψ1(y1, y2)
g¯1W (ω | y1, y2)
γ¯1(ω | y1, y2)
λ2(y1, y2) :=
ψ1(ya, y
eq)
1 + ψ1(ya, yeq)
g¯2W (ω | ya, yeq)
γ¯1(ω | ya, yeq)
so that
λ1(y1, y2) + λ2(y1, y2) = 1.
The assumptions that B(ω) ∈ [1
2
− α, 1
2
+ α] and b(ω) ≤ β, for all ω, imply that, for
all ω,
1
2
+α+β ∆u(ya, y
eq) ≥ B(ω) +b(ω)∆u(ya, yeq, ω) ≥ 1
2
−α+β ∆u(ya, yeq) ,
and
1
2
+α−β ∆u(ya, yeq) ≥ 1−B(ω)−b(ω)∆u(ya, yeq, ω) ≥ 1
2
−α−β ∆u(ya, yeq) .
Thus,
(1− F (ω))(1
2
+ α + β ∆u(ya, y
eq))
1
2
− α + β ∆u(ya, yeq) ≥ G
1
W (ω | ya, yeq)
≥ (1− F (ω))(
1
2
− α + β ∆u(ya, yeq))
1
2
+ α + β ∆u(ya, yeq)
and
(1− F (ω))(1
2
+ α− β ∆u(ya, yeq))
1
2
− α− β ∆u(ya, yeq)
≥ G2W (ω | ya, yeq)
≥ (1− F (ω))(
1
2
− α− β ∆u(ya, yeq))
1
2
− α− β ∆u(ya, yeq) ,
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which implies that
lim
α,β→0
G1W (ω | ya, yeq) = lim
α,β→0
G2W (ω | ya, yeq) = 1− F (ω) . (77)
A symmetric argument implies that
G1SP (ω | yb, yeq) = λ1(yb, yeq) G1W (ω | yb, yeq) + (1− λ1(yb, yeq)) G2W (ω | yb, yeq) , (78)
and
lim
α,β→0
G1W (ω | yb, yeq) = lim
α,β→0
G2W (ω | yb, yeq) = 1− F (ω) . (79)
Equations (76)-(79) imply that
limα,β→0 G1SP (ω | ya, yeq)− G1SP (ω | yb, yeq)
= (1− F (ω)) (λ1(ya, yeq) + (1− λ1(ya, yeq))− λ1(yb, yeq)− (1− λ1(yb, yeq))
= 0 .
Interpretation. The assumption that b(ω) ≤ β for β close to zero implies that
strategic substitutes and complements play a limited role. In the limit, i.e. for β = 0,
equilibria are in dominant strategies, and best responses no longer depend on the tax
policy propsed by the other party. The assumption that B(ω) ∈ [1
2
− α, 1
2
+ α] for
α close to zero implies that the race between the two parties is close. In a neighbor-
hood of such a symmetric, dominant strategy equilibrium we can be assured that an
equilibrium exists, is unique, and characterized by the optimality conditions referred
to in Proposition 1. For the case µ = 0 there is also a dominant strategy equilibrium
under Assumption 2. Looking at an interior µ therefore yields the same conclu-
sion as µ = ∞. Recall that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for generic
B(·)-functions cannot be expected because of the multi-dimensionality of the policy
space. The conditions that we have for equilibrium existence, equilibrium uniqness
and equilibrium characterization are to be evaluated against this background.
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F Alternative Settings
F.1 Amodel that includes ethical voters who always vote
We now assume that the base of each party is split into three groups: a group that
always votes, a group that always abstains, and a group of voters whose voting decision
follows from a rule-utilitarian calculation. We denote by q˜jv(ω) the fraction of definite
voters among the type ω supporters of party j, by q˜ja(ω) the fraction of definite
abstainers and by q˜ju(ω) the fraction of rule-utilitarian or ethical supporters, with
q˜jv(ω) + q˜ja(ω) + q˜ju(ω) = 1. We assume that these are random quantities both from
the perspective of parties when choosing platforms and from the perspective of voters
when choosing whether or not to vote. We write q˜j = {q˜jv(ω), q˜ja(ω), q˜ju(ω)}ω∈Ω for
the collection of random variables that refer to party j. We denote the expected value
of the random variable q˜ju(ω) by q¯ju(ω). The total number of votes for party 1 is
then a random variable equal to
V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) = E[(q˜1v(ω) + σ1 q˜1u(ω))B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] .
Analogously, the total number of votes for party 2 equals
V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2) = E[(q˜2v(ω) + σ2 q˜2u(ω))(1−B(u(p1, ω) − u(p2, ω) | ω))] .
We assume throughout that µ→∞, so that the per capital cost of voting is equal to
κσj.
Assume furthermore that the random variables q˜1 and q˜2 are driven by aggre-
gate shocks that affect the shares of definite and rule-utilitarian voters one the one
hand and of definite abstainers on the other so that the following two properties are
satisfied. First, the ratio of definite and rule-utilitarian voters is not subject to ran-
domness; i.e., shocks affect the ratio of potential voters to definite abstainers without
affecting the internal composition of the set of potential voters. Second, among the
supporters of party j, the ratio of definite to rule-utilitarian voters is the same for all
types.
Assumption 5. There is a pair of independent random variables, η1 and η2, so that,
for all ω,
q˜1v(ω) = q¯1v(ω) η1 and q˜
1u(ω) = q¯1u(ω) η1
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and
q˜2v(ω) = q¯2v(ω) η2 and q˜
2u(ω) = q¯2u(ω) η2.
In addition, there are numbers q1v, q1u, q2v and q2u so that, for all ω
q¯1v(ω) = q1v and q¯1u(ω) = q1u
and
q¯2v(ω) = q2v and q¯2u(ω) = q2u .
Under Assumption 5 the total number of votes for party 1 can be written as
V˜ 1(p1, p2, σ1, q˜1) = η1 V 1(p1, p2, σ1)
where V 1(p1, p2, σ1) := m1(σ1) B1(p1, p2) and m1(σ1) := q1v + σ1 q1u is a multiplier
that determines how party 1's base B1(p1, p2) is transformed into actual votes. Anal-
ogously, the votes for party 2 are given by V˜ 2(p1, p2, σ2, q˜2) = η2 V 2(p1, p2, σ2), where
V 2(p1, p2, σ2) := m2(σ2) B2(p1, p2) and m2(σ2) = q2v + σ2 q2u. Armed with this
notation, we can express the probability that party 1 wins as
pi1(p1, p2, σ1, σ2) = P
(
V 1(p1, p2, σ1)
V 2(p1, p2, σ2)
)
= P
(
m1(σ1)
m2(σ2)
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
)
, (80)
where P is the cdf of the random variable η2/η1. Its density function is denoted by ρ.
Note that imposing Assumption 5 implies a multiplicative separability between the
term
Rσ(p1, p2) =
m1(σ1(p1, p2))
m2(σ2(p1, p2))
, (81)
that is shaped by the rule-utilitarian voter's participation thresholds and the ratio of
their bases
RB(p1, p2) =
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
so that we can write
pi1(p1, p2, σ1, σ2) = P
(
Rσ(p1, p2) RB(p1, p2)
)
. (82)
Turnout. For now, we take the party platforms p1 and p2 as given and characterize
the parties' equilibrium turnout. We say that the turnout game has an interior
equilibrium if 0 < σ1∗(p1, p2) < 1 and 0 < σ2∗(p1, p2) < 1. If the function P is
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continuously differentiable then an interior equilibrium is characterized by the first
order conditions
pi1σ1(·) W 1 − κ q1u B1 = 0 , (83)
and
− pi1σ2(·) W 2 − κ q2u B2 = 0 . (84)
Using Assumption 5 we can rewrite these conditions as
ρ(·)Rσ(p1, p2)
q1v + σ1 q1u
W 1 − κ B1 = 0 , (85)
and
ρ(·)Rσ(p1, p2)
q2v + σ2 q2u
W 2 − κ B2 = 0 . (86)
Equations (85) and (86) imply that
Rσ(p1, p2) =
W 1/κ B1
W 2/κ B2
=
W 1/B1
W 2/ B2
, (87)
which is the same expression as (7) in the body of the text.
Probability of winning. Suppose first that parties seek to maximize the proba-
bility of winning, i.e.,
P
(
Rσ(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
)
and party 2 seeks to minimize this expression. As P is a non-decreasing function we
can as well assume that party 1 maximizes
Rσ(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
or any monotone transformation of it such as, e.g.,
ln
(
Rσ(p1, p2)
)
+ ln
(
B1(p1, p2)
)− ln (B2(p1, p2)) . (88)
Remark 1. The conventional probabilistic voting model can be viewed as a special
case of this that is defined by two properties. First, since turnout is exogenous and
universal, Rσ(p1, p2) = 1 for all (p1, p2) and hence ln (Rσ(p1, p2)) = 0. Second, and
again for the reason that turnout is exogenous and universal, V 1 = B1(p1, p2) and
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V 2 = B2(p1, p2) = 1−B1(p1, p2). In the probabilistic voting model, the objective of
party 1 can therefore be taken to be ln (B1(p1, p2))−ln (1−B1(p1, p2)) or simply V 1 =
B1(p1, p2). I.e., maximizing the probability of winning is the same as maximizing the
number of votes.
Remark 2. With Nash equilibrium rather than subgame perfect equilibrium as the
solution concept (or, equivalently, with µ = 0), the parties view Rσ(p1, p2) as exoge-
nously fixed, albeit at the level that is induced by the equilibrium policies. Party 1
then seeks to maximize
ln
(
B1(p1, p2)
)− ln (B2(p1, p2))
and party 2 seeks to minimize this expression. Since B2(p1, p2) = 1 − B1(p1, p2),
party 1's objective can as well simply taken to be B1(p1, p2) and B2(p1, p2) can be
taken to be the objective of party 2. Nash equilibrium then requires that p1 solves
maxpˆ1∈P B1(pˆ1, p2) and that p2 solves maxpˆ2∈P B2(p1, pˆ2). Note that these equi-
librium are also the equilibrium conditions in the conventional probabilistic voting
model. Thus, equilibrium existence in the conventional probabilistic voting model
implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the given setup.
If the turnout subgame has an interior equilibrium, then the probability of winning
for party 1 can be written in a reduced form that no longer involves an explicit
reference to the participation thresholds σ1 and σ2. Specifically, equation (87) implies
that the winning probability in (82) becomes
p¯i1(p1, p2) = P
(
ψ1(p1, p2)
)
for ψ1(p1, p2) :=
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
. (89)
Thus, as in the main body of the text (Proposition 1), under Assumption 5, if (p1, p2)
is a pair of interior subgame perfect equilibrium policies, then it it is a saddle point
of the function ψ.
F.2 Public goods
Our framework for studying endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms in polit-
ical competition is developed for a generic policy domain. We have emphasized that
the set of non-linear income tax systems is a policy domain of particular interest.
That said, our framework can also be applied to study the implications of endoge-
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nous turnout for political competition over other policy domains. In this section, we
briefly summarize the results from such an analysis. Specifically, we report on the
implications of our framework for public goods provision.
Individuals have preferences over public goods that are given by u(ω, p) = ω p −
k(p), where p ∈ R+ denotes the quantity of the public good, ω ∈ Ω is an individual's
public goods preference and the cost function k captures the per capita cost of public
goods provision.25 We begin with a characterization of the public good provision level
that party 1 would choose if its sole objective was to mobilize its supporters. In this
case, it would choose q1 with the objective to maximize
W 1(p1, p2) = E[G1W (ω p1 − k(p1)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] .
Given p2, the first order condition characterizing the optimal choice of p1 is
E
[G1W (ω | p1, p2) ω] = k′(p1)
where
G1W (ω | p1, p2) =
g1W (u(p
1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)
E[g1W (u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
.
This first order condition is a political economy analogue to the Samuelson rule for
first-best public good provision. For the given setup, the Samuelson rule stipulates
that E[ω] = k′(p), i.e., it requires equal weights for all public goods preferences.
For the purpose of mobilizing its supporters, party 1 does not apply equal weights.
Instead the public good preferences of different individuals are weighted according to
the function G1W . The public good provision level that party 1 would choose if it only
wanted only to demobilize the supporters of party 2 is such that
E
[G2W (ω | p1, p2) ω] = k′(p1) ,
and the policy that maximizes W
1(p1p2)
W 2(p1,p2)
satisfies
E[G1SP (ω | p1, p2) ω] = k′(p1)
25In an economy with a continuum of individuals and private information on public goods prefer-
ences, equal cost sharing is the only way of satisfying robust incentive compatibility, budget balance
and anonymity, see Bierbrauer and Hellwig (2016).
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where
G1SP (ω | p1, p2) := λ1(p1, p2) G1W (ω | p1, p2) + (1− λ1(p1, p2)) G2W (ω | p1, p2)
and λ1(p1, p2) are defined as above. Again, the party compromises between mobilizing
its own supporters and demobilizing the supporters of the other party  with the
weight on the own supporters being smaller if the party is more likely to win.
F.3 Alternative modelling choices for ethical voting
The ethical voter models by Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), on the one hand, and
by Coate and Conlin (2004), on the other differ, in some aspects. For instance,
Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) assume that the population consists of ethical voters
and of non-ethical voters. Moreover, the fraction of ethical voters is a priori uncertain.
Uncertainty over election outcomes in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) is entirely due
to this uncertainty about the fraction of ethical voters. Coate and Conlin (2004), by
contrast, assume that all voters are ethical voters. Uncertainty over election outcomes
in their framework is driven by uncertainty over the policy preferences of these ethical
voters.
In this section of the Online-Appendix we show that these modelling choices are
not essential for our main results. We could go either way. In the main text, we
present an analysis that adopts the framework of Feddersen and Sandroni (2006).
We show that we could as well work with the model of Coate and Conlin (2004) in
Section F.3.2.
For tractability, our adaptation of Feddersen and Sandroni makes use of an as-
sumption which implies that the parties' bases add up to a constant. An advantage
is that it becomes transparent that the standard probabilistic voting model is nested
as a special case of our analysis. In Section F.3.3 we present an extension that does
not rest on this assumption. The extension shows that the parties' trade-off between
attracting swing voters, mobilizing their own core voters and demobilizing the oppo-
nent's core voters is at the heart of our analysis, with or without the assumption that
the parties' bases add up to a constant.
The bottom line is that what is really driving our results is the combination of
probabilistic and ethical voting. We use the probabilistic voting model to determine
preferences over policies and parties. We use a model of ethical voting to determine
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turnout. How exactly we model ethical voting is of secondary importance. Our
analysis is robust to alternative specifications of ethical voting.
F.3.1 A general framework
We begin with a general framework for political competition that connects proba-
bilistic and ethical voting. As will become clear, the general framework contains as
special cases
• an environment where all voters are ethical voters and with uncertainty about
policy preferences as in Coate and Conlin (2004),
• an environment where the population share of ethical voters is a random quan-
tity as in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006).
Party and policy preferences. Consider a pair of policies p1 and p2 proposed by
parties 1 and 2, respectively. As in the body of the text, a type ω-individual preferes
a victory of party 1 if
u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) ≥ ε ,
where the utility function u captures policy preferences and the variable ε captures
idiosyncratic party preferences. We assume that, conditional on ω, ε is a random
variable with a distribution that can be represented by a cumulative distribution
function B˜(· | ω, η). Thus,
B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η)
is the fraction of type ω-voters who are better off if party 1 wins. The complement
1− B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η)
is the fraction of type ω-voters who are better off if party 2 wins.
The formulation differs from the one in the main text in that we allow these
distributions to be random objects themselves. The distributions of idiosyncratic
party preferences now depend on the realization of a random variable η. Thus, we
allow for uncertainty in policy preferences as in Coate and Conlin (2004).
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Example: Aggregate uncertainty on preferences. At this stage there is no
need to introduce more specific assumptions about η. Still, the following example
might be helpful to get an idea of what the randomness in party and policy prefer-
ences might look like: For any type ω, there is a set of feasible distributions Φ(ω),
with generic entry B˜(· | ω, η). Distributions in this set can be ordered according to
first order stochastic dominance. Let this order be represented by a mapping from the
unit interval to the set of feasible distributions. Also suppose that there is a random
variable ηω taking values in the unit interval, indicating which of these distributions
materializes. Finally, let there be one such a random variable for each type ω. Then
the random variable η that governs the state of the system is a stochastic process that
can be written as η = {ηω}ω∈Ω.
In Feddersen and Sadroni (2006), by contrast, party and policy preference are deter-
ministically fixed once the alternatives p1 and p2 are given. The following assumption
contains a more formal version of this statement.
Assumption 6 (Feddersen and Sandroni: No aggregate uncertainty on pref-
erences). For every type ω, there exists a cumulative distribution function B(· | ω),
so that, for all p1 and p2 and all possible realizations of η,
B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η) = B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω) .
Ethical and non-ethical voters. A complete description of the state of the system
also requires to specify, for each type, the fraction of ethical voters. Formally, let
q˜1(ω, η) be the fraction of ethical voters among those type ω-individuals who are
better off if party 1 wins. Likewise denote by q˜2(ω, η) be the fraction of ethical
type ω-individuals who are better off if party 2 wins. In the approach of Feddersen
and Sandroni these are random objects. Here, we capture this again, through the
dependence on an aggregate shock, or, more specifically, the random variable η. By
contrast, in the model of Coate and Conlin, q˜1 and q˜1 are set equal to one. For ease
of reference, we also highlight this assumption.
Assumption 7 (Coate and Conlin: All voters are ethical voters). For any
ω, q˜1(ω, η) and q˜2(ω, η) are degenerate random variables so that
q˜1(ω, η) = q˜2(ω, η) = 1
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for all realizations of η.
The parties' bases. The potential voters of party 1 are those who vote for party
1 in case of turning out to vote. This mass of these voters is a random variable
B˜1(p1, p2, η) := E
[
q˜1(ω, η) B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η)
]
Analogously, the mass party 2's potential voters is given by
B˜2(p1, p2, η) := E
[
q˜2(ω, η)(1− B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η))
]
We denote, respectively, by
B1(p1, p2) =
ˆ
B˜1(p1, p2, η) dP (η)
and
B2(p1, p2) =
ˆ
B˜2(p1, p2, η) dP (η)
the expected values of B˜1(p1, p2, η) and B˜2(p1, p2, η), where P is the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the random variable η. For brevity, we also refer to B1(p1, p2)
and B2(p1, p2) as the parties' bases.
The turnout subgame. As in the main text, the ethical voters of party 1 choose
σ1 to maximize
pi1(σ1, σ2, p1, p2) W 1(p1, p2)− k(σ1) B1(p1, p2)
and the ethical voters of party 2 choose σ2 to maximize
(1− pi1(σ1, σ2, p1, p2)) W 2(p1, p2)− k(σ2) B2(p1, p2) .
We have to adjust, however, our definitions of W 1(p1, p2) and W 2(p1, p2) so that they
are consistent with the more general setup that we are currently exploring. We now
let
W˜ 1(p1, p2, η) = E
[ˆ
R
max
{
u(p1, ω)− [u(p2, ω) + ε] , 0} b˜(ε | ω, η) dε ] . (90)
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denote the stakes for the ethical voters of party 1 in state η and let W 1(p1, p2) be the
expectation of W˜ 1(p1, p2, η), conditional on party 1 winning the election. We denote
by b˜(· | ω, η) the derivative of B˜(· | ω, η), i.e. b˜(· | ω, η) is the density of ε, conditional
on type ω and state η. We define W˜ 2(p1, p2, η) and W 2(p1, p2) analogously. Party 1
wins the election if
σ1 B˜1(p1, p2, η) ≥ σ2 B˜2(p1, p2, η) ,
where σ1 and σ2 are the turnout rates of the potential voters of party 1 and party 2,
respectively. Equivalently, party 1 wins if
σ1
σ2
× B˜
1(p1, p2, η)
B˜2(p1, p2, η)
≥ 1 .
The probability that party 1 wins the election is therefore given by
pi1(σ1, σ2) = prob
(
σ1
σ2
× B˜
1(p1, p2, η)
B˜2(p1, p2, η)
≥ 1
)
.
For later reference, note that we can also write this winning probability as an average
winning probability over the different states η, i.e. so that
p¯i1(p1, p2) =
ˆ
prob
(
σ1
σ2
× B˜
1(p1, p2, η)
B˜2(p1, p2, η)
≥ 1 | η
)
dP (η) . (91)
Note that the turnout rates enter this expression only via the ratio σ
1
σ2
. This implies
that our analysis of the turnout subgame  for given policies p1 ans p2  does not
depend on wether we adopt the Feddersen-Sandroni or the Coate-Conlin formulation.
As a consequence, Lemma 1 in the main text goes through. Thus, irrespectively of
whether Assumption 7 or Assumption 6 is imposed, in an equilibrium of the turnout
subgame
σ1∗(p1, p2)
σ2∗(p1, p2)
=
[
W 1(p1, p2) /B1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2) /B2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
. (92)
F.3.2 Adopting the approach of Coate and Conlin: Only ethical voters
We now impose Assumption 7, i.e. the Assumption made by Coate and Conlin (2004)
that there are only ethical voters. Thus, to have non-trivial winning probabilities, we
must not at the same time impose Assumption 6. Put differently, we suppose that
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policy preferences are subject to aggregate shocks. We will establish two findings:
First, our Proposition 1 in the main text rests on a simplifying assumption on the
nature of aggregate uncertainty. The same assumption can be made in the Coate and
Conlin version of our model and has the same effect. Proposition 1 is therefore robust
to the way in which we model ethical voting. Second, the parties' bases add up to
a constant. A model of ethical voting that does not share this property therefore
requires to relax Assumption 7.
Recall equations (91) and (92), i.e. that taking the endogeneity of turnout into
account, the probability of winning can be written as
p¯i1(p1, p2) =
ˆ
prob
(
σ1
σ2
× B˜
1(p1, p2, η)
B˜2(p1, p2, η)
≥ 1 | η
)
dP (η) ,
where
σ1
σ2
=
[
W 1(p1, p2) /B1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2) /B2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
.
In principle, there is no problem to working directly with this objective, it gives raise
to the same tradeoffs as those highlighted in our manuscript. For a tractable compar-
ative statics analysis, we would, however, have to impose (possibly non-parametric)
assumptions on how different realizations of the random variable η shift the distribu-
tions B˜(·). Our Assumption 1 in the main text is one conceivable way of doing this,
a way that has the advantage of simplicity. The main text focuses on the Feddersen-
Sandroni version of ethical voting and Assumption 1 is imposed in this context. As we
will now explain, we can get to same conclusions also with a Coate-Conlin approach.
To see this, consider the following assumption.
Assumption 8 (Multiplicative shocks I). Suppose that η = (η1, η2) is a pair of
two random variables η1 and η2 so that
B˜1(p1, p2, η) = η1 B1(p1, p2) (93)
and
B˜2(p1, p2, η) = η2 B2(p1, p2) . (94)
Under Assumption 8 the aggregate shocks η1 and η2 can be interpreted as per-
centage deviations of the random variables B˜1(p1, p2, η) and B˜2(p1, p2, η) from their
respective means. To see this, suppose that the means of both η1 and η2 are equal to
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1 and rewrite (93) and (94) as
B˜1(p1, p2, η)−B1(p1, p2)
B1(p1, p2)
= η1 − 1
and
B˜2(p1, p2, η)−B2(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
= η2 − 1
The left hand sides of these equations give the percentage deviation of the random
variables B˜1(p1, p2, η) and B˜2(p1, p2, η) from their respective means. The right-hand
sides give the deviations of η1 and η2 from their means.
Under Assumption 8 the expression for the probability of winning in (91) becomes
p¯i1(p1, p2) = prob
([
W 1(p1, p2) /B1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2) /B2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
× B
1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
≥ η
2
η1
)
(95)
Upon letting η := η
2
η1
, we can write this as
p¯i1(p1, p2) = P
([
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
×
[
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
] 1
1+µ
)
. (96)
P is a cumulative distribution function and hence a monotonic function. Maximiz-
ing (minimizing) p¯i1(p1, p2) is therefore equivalent to maximizing (minimizing) the
argument of P , [
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
] µ
1+µ
×
[
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
] 1
1+µ
or any monotone transformation of it such as
1
1 + µ
log
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
+
µ
1 + µ
log
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
.
We summarize these observations in the following Lemma.
Lemma 12. Suppose that Assumptions 7 and 8 hold. Then party 1's objective is to
maximize
ψ1(p1, p2) :=
1
1 + µ
log
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
+
µ
1 + µ
log
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
, (97)
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and party 2's objective is to minimize it. Thus, if (p1∗, p2∗) is a pair of interior
subgame perfect equilibrium policies, then it is a saddle point of the function ψ1(p1, p2).
Note that the Lemma gives exactly the same conclusion as Proposition 1 in the
body of the text. This shows that  even though Assumptions (93) and (94) may
have a more plausible microfoundation in the Feddersen-Sadroni-model  our ap-
proach is essentially agnostic on the question how to best model ethical voting. We
can work both with the Coate-Conlin formulation and with the Feddersen-Sandroni
formulation.
The parties' bases add up to a constant. The following Lemma shows that the
Coate-Conlin specification of ethical voting shares one property of the model that we
present in the main text, namely that the parties bases add up to a constant. Thus, a
change of policies that increases the base for, say, party 1 translates one-for-one into
a decrease of the base of party 2.
Lemma 13. Suppose that Assumption 7 holds. Then
B1(p1, p2) +B2(p1, p2) = 1 .
Proof. If q˜1(ω, η) = q˜2(ω, η) = 1 for all realizations of η, we have
B˜1(p1, p2, η) := E
[
q˜1(ω, η) B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η)
]
= E
[
B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η)
]
= 1− E
[
1− B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η)
]
= 1− E
[
q˜2(ω, η)(1− B˜(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω, η))
]
= 1− B˜2(p1, p2, η) .
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Hence, also
B1(p1, p2) :=
´
B˜1(p1, p2, η) dP (η)
= 1− ´ B˜2(p1, p2, η) dP (η)
= 1−B2(p1, p2) .
F.3.3 An alternative version of the Feddersen-Sandroni model in which
the parties' bases do not add up to a constant
In the following, we consider an extension of our model in which the parties' bases
do not add up to a constant. It follows from Lemma 13 that we cannot employ As-
sumption 7 according to which the electorate consists, in all states, entirely of ethical
voters. For ease of exposition, we impose instead Assumption 6, due to Feddersen
and Sandroni, so that there is no aggregate uncertainty in policy preferences. This
has the expositional advantage that all the aggregate uncertainty in the model is due
to the randomness of the share of ethical voters.
We seek to show that the parties' tradeoffs between attracting swing voters, cater-
ing to their own core voters in an attempt to mobilize them and catering to the rival's
core voters with the intention to demobilize them does not rest on the assumption
that the parties's bases add up to a constant. Recall that, in the main text, this
property is implied by the assumption, that, for any type ω, the random variables
q˜1(ω, η) and q˜2(ω, η) have the same mean
q¯(ω) :=
ˆ
q˜1(ω, η) dP (η) =
ˆ
q˜1(ω, η) dP (η) .
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Therefore,
B1(p1, p2) =
´
B˜1(p1, p2, η) dP (η)r
=
´
E[q˜1(ω, η) B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] dP (η)
= E
[(´
q˜1(ω, η) dP (η)
)
B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
= E [q¯(ω)B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] ,
(98)
and, by the same logic,
B2(p1, p2) = E [q¯(ω)(1−B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω))] . (99)
Obviously, equations (98) and (99) imply that
B1(p1, p2) +B2(p1, p2) = E[q¯(ω)]
so that the two bases add up to an exogenous constant E[q¯(ω)], i.e. a term that does
not depend on the policies that are proposed.
Example. As a simple case that avoids the property that the parties bases add up
to a constant consider the following Assumption.
Assumption 9 (Party specific means). There are numbers q¯1 and q¯2 so that, for
all ω,
q¯1 =
ˆ
q˜1(ω, η) dP (η) and q¯2 =
ˆ
q˜2(ω, η) dP (η) .
The assumption says, all supporters of party 1 are, irrespective of their type ω,
equally likely to be of the ethical type: For any supporter of party 1, this probability is
equal to q¯1. Likewise, all supporters of party 2 are of the ethical type with probability
q¯2.
An implication of this Assumption is that
B1(p1, p2) = q¯1 E[B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
and
B2(p1, p2) = q¯2 E[1−B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] .
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Hence,
B1(p1, p2) +B2(p1, p2) = q¯2 +
(
q¯1 − q¯2)E[B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)] ,
which implies that the bases add up to a quantity that depends on p1 and p2. The
overall mass of potential voters therefore does depend on the policies that the parties.
Also note that
B2(p1, p2) = q¯2 − q¯2E[B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
= q¯2 − q¯2
q¯1
q¯1 E[B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
= q¯2 − q¯2
q¯1
B1(p1, p2).
Note that it is still the case that an increase of party 1's base implies a decrease of
party 2's base  even though no longer one-by-one.
Henceforth and in parallel to our previous analysis we impose an assumption of
multiplicative shocks. This assumption of multiplicative shocks is consistent with
Assumption 9, i.e. both assumptions can hold simultaneously, but does not require
it. That is, we can have multiplicative shocks without party specific means.
Assumption 10 (Multiplicative shocks II). Let q¯1(ω) :=
´
q˜1(ω, η)dP (η) be the
expected value of the random variable q˜1(ω, η) for any ω. Analogously, let q¯2(ω) :=´
q˜2(ω, η)dP (η) be the expected value of the random variable q˜2(ω, η). Suppose that
η = (η1, η2) is a pair of two random variables η1 and η2 so that, for all ω,
q˜1(ω, η) = η1 q¯1(ω) (100)
and
q˜2(ω, η) = η2 q¯2(ω) . (101)
Note the following implications of this Assumption:
B˜1(p1, p2, η) = E[q˜1(ω, η)B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
= η1E[q¯1(ω)B(u(p1, ω)− u(p2, ω) | ω)]
= η1 B1(p1, p2)
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and, analogously,
B˜2(p1, p2, η) = η2 B2(p1, p2) .
This shows that equations (93) and (94)  imposed previously in our analysis of the
Coate and Conlin model  also hold in the given context. An immediate implication is
that Lemma 12 also extends to the given setup. This observation yields the following
Corollary.
Corollary 4. Suppose that Assumption 10 holds. Then party 1's objective is to
maximize
ψ1(p1, p2) :=
1
1 + µ
log
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
+
µ
1 + µ
log
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
, (102)
and party 2's objective is to minimize it. Thus, if (p1∗, p2∗) is a pair of interior
subgame perfect equilibrium policies, then it is a saddle point of the function ψ1(p1, p2).
The significance of the Corollary is to show that Proposition 1 in our main text
also extends to a model in which the parties' bases do not add up to a constant. Thus,
the tradeoffs that we highlight in our main text also extend to the given setup, albeit
with some modifications. To understand these modifications, it is again instructive
to look first at the polar cases µ =∞ and µ = 0.
For µ =∞, the parties' bases do not matter at all for the probability of winning
the election. The analysis therefore has exactly the same logic as the one presented
in the body of the text: Party 1 focuses on maximizing
W 1(p1, p2)
W 2(p1, p2)
and party 2 seeks to minimize this expression. From the perspective of party 1, the
numerator W 1(p1, p2) points to the political returns from increasing the stakes for its
own core voters, the denominator points to the political returns from decreasing the
stakes for party 2's core voters. Moreover, how these motives balance depends on
the equilibrium value of W 1(p1, p2)/W 2(p1, p2). The larger this quantity, the larger is
party 1's equilibrium probability of winning and the more it has an incentive to focus
on the demobilization of the potential voters of party 2.26
26Recall from the analysis in the main text that any equilibrium is symmetric and that this
observation makes it possible to pin down the equilibrium value of W 1(p1, p2)/W 2(p1, p2).
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The case µ = 0 is the exact mirror image. The stakes for the parties' core voters
play no role, and all that matters is the ratio of the parties bases. Party 1 now seeks
to maximize
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
while party 2 minimizes this expression. This problem of party 1 problem is  contrary
to our analysis in the main text  not generally equivalent to maximizing B1(p1, p2).
Remark 3. This equivalence holds, however, if we impose, in addition, Assumption
9. To see this, note that in this case,
B1(p1, p2)
B2(p1, p2)
=
B1(p1, p2)
q¯2 − q¯2
q¯1
B1(p1, p2)
,
which is an expression that is increasing in B1(p1, p2).
If the equivalence does not hold, party 1 faces a tradeoff between maximizing
B1(p1, p2) and minimizing B2(p1, p2). Maximizing B1(p1, p2) would mean to cater
primarily to those voters who are likely to swing into the base of party 1. Minimizing
B2(p1, p2) would give priority to those voters who swing out of the base of party 2 if
party 1 offers a better deal. Since the bases do not add up to a constant, those who
swing out of the base of party 2 do not automatically swing into the base of party 1.
Thus, there is again a tradeoff between doing something that is good for the own vote
share and doing something that is bad for the rival's vote share. How this tradeoff is
resolved depends, again, on the equilibrium value of B1(p1, p2)/B2(p1, p2). The larger
this value the larger the weight on the minimization of the rival's base.
Obviously, for values of µ that are interior, µ ∈ (0,∞) both forces are at play,
and the parties consider the implications of their platforms choices both for their
relative base advantage, as measured by B1(p1, p2)/B2(p1, p2), and for their relative
stake advantage, as measured by W 1(p1, p2)/W 2(p1, p2).
To summarize this discussion we highlight two observations: First, a more general
model in which the parties bases do not add up to a constant gives rise to the same
tradeoffs as our analysis in the main text, but possibly with some modifications in
the relevant formulas. Second, if we impose an additional assumption, Assumption
9, then no such modifications are needed and the analysis in the main text literally
extends  even though the parties' bases do not add up to a constant.
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